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Abstract 
 
 
This article portrays a bleak picture of European realities. Analyzing world social, gender, ecological 
and economic development on the basis of the main 9 predictors, compatible with the majority of the 
more than 240 published studies on the cross-national determinants of the “human condition” around 
the globe, we first present results of 32 equations about development performance in 131 countries 
with available data. We come to the conclusion that while there is some confirmation for the “blue”, 
market paradigm as the best and most viable way of world systems governance concerning economic 
growth, re-distribution and gender issues, the “red-green” counter-position is confirmed concerning 
such vital and basic indicators as life expectancy and the human development index. 
 
We also show that Europe’s crisis is not caused by what the neo-liberals term a “lack of world 
economic openness” but rather, on the contrary, by the enormous amount of passive globalization that 
Europe – together with Latin America – experienced over recent years. Our combined measure of the 
velocity of the globalization process is based on the increases of capital penetration over time, on the 
increases of economic openness over time, and on the decreases of the comparative price level over 
time: the United States, Mexico, larger parts of Africa and large sections of West and South Asia 
escaped from the combined pressures of globalization, while Eastern and Southern Latin America, 
very large parts of Europe, Russia and China were characterized by a specially high tempo of 
globalization. 
 
                                            
1 Arno Tausch is in his academic function Adjunct Professor (Universitaetsdozent) of Political Science at Innsbruck 
University, Department of Political Science, A-6020 Innsbruck University; Innrain 52/III; Austria (Founder: Professor Anton 
Pelinka). In his professional functions, he is involved in the process of the enlargement of the European Union since 1992. 
His research program is focused on world systems studies, development and dependency studies, European studies, and 
quantitative peace research. Available book publications: http://www.campusi.com. Opinions expressed in this contribution 
are exclusively those of the author in his capacity as adjunct professor at Austrian Universities. The author thanks the Office 
of Commissioners Michel Barnier and Danuta Hubner and my colleagues Tessaleno Devezas, Francesco Duina, Hannelore 
Fielhauer, Glenn Firebaugh, James K. Galbraith, Alfonso Galindo Lucas, Edeltraud Glettler, Almas Heshmati, Robert 
Holzmann, Jeffrey Kentor, Joze Mencinger, Karl Mueller, Branko Milanovic, Helmut Lang, Nahuel Oddone, Kunibert 
Raffer, Andreas Schaller, Krystyna Tausch, Veronika Tiefenbacher and Brigitte Zarfl for many insights that led to the 
formulation of this essay. Responsibility rests hoever with the author. 
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The “wider Europe” of the EU-25 is not too distantly away from the social realities of the more 
advanced Latin American countries. From the viewpoint of world systems theory such tendencies are 
not a coincidental movement along the historic ups and downs of social indicators, but the very 
symptom of a much more deep-rooted crisis, which is the beginning of the real re-marginalization and 
re-peripherization of the European continent. 
 
We finally also show the relevance of these assumptions for the analysis of European regional 
inequality. Established economics teaches us that for economic gaps to be bridged, a process of 
convergence sets in that was described by Bela Balassa and Paul Samuelson, independently from each 
other, more than 4 decades ago, and which is called ever since the “Balassa-Samuelson effect”. But a 
reversal of what was once known as the Balassa/Samuelson effect has set in, with falling prices of 
non-tradables in the highly developed European center countries.  
 
Our macro-quantitative calculations show that considering other important intervening factors, like 
development levels and human capital formation, the ultraliberal thinking inherent in the recent 
“Bolkestein directive” that should lead to a considerable lowering of price levels in the formerly “non-
tradable” sectors of services in Europe would be certainly compatible with some aspects of growth and 
better employment (and thus also gender relations), but our three main other indicators of 
globalization, i.e. high foreign saving, “economic freedom” and high MNC penetration ratios, are still 
very systematically linked with severe deficits in the social sphere, whatever the research design 
chosen. And in addition, powerful forces of agglomeration propel Europe in the direction of further 
regional income concentration and inequality, thus blocking the hopes of the poorer segments of the 
East European new member countries. A process of catching up development seems under these 
conditions a very remote hope indeed. 
 
JEL Classification: C21, D31, E30, F02 
 
Key words: Cross-Section Models, Income Distribution, Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles – 
General; International Economic Order, Inequality, Economic Integration: General 
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Ai, esta terra ainda vai cumprir seu ideal 
Ainda vai tornar-se um imenso Portugal 
 
[Ai, this land is still going to accomplish its ideal 
and will transform itself into an immense Portugal] 
 
 
Chico Buarque, Fado Tropical (1972) 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In this paper, a thorough re-analysis of the performance of the European social model existing in the 
EU-25 should be undertaken. The political background for such a “reality check” is clear. At the 
forceful start of the British EU-Presidency, PM Blair said in the European Parliament: 
 
“What would a different policy agenda for Europe look like? First, it would modernize our social 
model. Again, some have suggested I want to abandon Europe's social model. But tell me: what type of 
social model is it that has 20 million unemployed in Europe, productivity rates falling behind those of 
the USA; that is allowing more science graduates to be produced by India than by Europe; and that, 
on any relative index of a modern economy - skills, R&D, patents, IT, is going down not up? India will 
expand its biotechnology sector fivefold in the next five years. China has trebled its spending on R&D 
in the last five. Of the top 20 universities in the world today, only two are now in Europe. (…). The 
purpose of our social model should be to enhance our ability to compete, to help our people cope with 
globalization, to let them embrace its opportunities and avoid its dangers. Of course we need a social 
Europe. But it must be a social Europe that works. (…). And we've been told how to do it. The Kok 
report in 2004 shows the way. Investment in knowledge, in skills, in active labor market policies, in 
science parks and innovation, in higher education, in urban regeneration, in help for small businesses. 
This is modern social policy, not regulation and job protection that may save some jobs for a time at 
the expense of many jobs in the future. (…). And since this is a day for demolishing caricatures, let me 
demolish one other: the idea that Britain is in the grip of some extreme Anglo-Saxon market 
philosophy that tramples on the poor and disadvantaged”.. (British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
available at: http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page7714.asp)  
 
After the negative results of the constitutional referenda in France and the Netherlands, it would be 
foolish to deny the existence of the crisis of the “European model”. But what are its causes? Too much 
globalization, too much distance from the average European citizen, or too heavy tax burdens, too 
much regulation? Or a shrinking demographic base and barriers to migration? Or the rigid policies of 
the European Central Bank and the Maastricht accords? 
 
This article leaves behind the trodden paths of transatlantic comparison US-EU and looks at the real 
global issues that cause some nations to stagnate while others rush forward. Among these nations, you 
find today China, India, and the new industrial giants of East Asia that recover from the effects of the 
“Asian Crisis” years ago. This article studies the European crisis in a global, cross-national, 
quantitative and systematic way. A thorough, comparative method is needed to look at the underlying 
issues of faltering economic growth and rising income inequality as well as the stagnating employment 
situation on the European Continent. 
 
Latin America, after more than two decades of neo-liberal economic policies, goes to the left, while 
Europe embarked on neo-liberalism in the 1990s and follows precisely such a course of policies that 
seem to have gone bankrupt in Latin America nowadays, ever since. So, is Latin America in reality the 
“mirror” of Europe’s own future? You name the Latin American countries that now follow other paths 
of development: Venezuela, Bolivia with its more radical movements against the status quo, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile … With every election in Latin America these days, the left, and not the neo-
liberal right, seems to triumph, while in Europe powerful social forces still maintain “the Washington 
Consensus”. 
 
John Williamson originally coined the phrase in 1990 “to refer to the lowest common denominator of 
policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 
1989.”2 These policies were: 
                                            
2 Williamson, John. “Did the Washington Consensus Fail?” Outline of Remarks at CSIS. Washington DC: Institute for 
International Economics, November 6, 2002. and Williamson, John. “What Should the World Bank Think About the 
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• Fiscal discipline  
• A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary 
education, and infrastructure  
• Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base)  
• Interest rate liberalization  
• A competitive exchange rate  
• Trade liberalization  
• Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment  
• Privatization  
• Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit)  
• Secure property rights 
 
Europe can learn a lot from Latin America. First of all, Latin America ever since the end of the era of 
import substitution in the mid 1960s and the early 1970s and the installation of harsh, right-wing 
oriented military regimes in such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay at that time was a 
real experimenting ground for neo-liberal economists (“the famous Chicago boys” in Chile), whose 
experiments were put in practice in Eastern Europe after the transition in the 1990s and whose 
experiments are now being increasingly implemented in Western Europe.  
 
Starting from the mid 1980s, Europe began to attempt to outpace the rhythm of globalization in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and today has larger capital inflows per GDP than Latin America.  
 
The present article starts out from a systematic, cross-national methodology that has been presented in 
great detail in other recent publications written by the same author, and arrives also at new results 
hitherto unpublished in the literature. 
 
 
2. Reviewing recently published cross-national evidence 
about the development capability of the EU 
 
 
In earlier published research, it has already been shown that a rigorous quantitative analysis of the 
patterns of world development reveals only mixed results at best about the development capabilities of 
the European Union in the world society. One recent essay (Tausch, 2006) used 9 predictors of world 
development, which measure the already achieved development level as an important control variable 
for possibly diminishing returns on capital as well as 3 dimensions of globalization, economic freedom 
versus state interventions and two variables that measure possible counter-identities to the otherwise 
now “unified house of capitalism” – the membership of a country in the “house of Islam” (“Dar al 
Islam”) or membership in the European Union (EU-15). In that essay, the choice of the 131 countries 
was determined by the availability of a complete data series for these independent variables (if not 
mentioned otherwise, UNDP data): 
 
 
• (I-S)/GNP (calculated from UNDP 2000) 
• development level ln (GDP PPP pc) 
• development level, square (maturity effects) ln (GDP PPP pc)^2 
• EU-15-membership (EU member by the year 2000, dummy variable) 
                                                                                                                                        
Washington Consensus?” World Bank Research Observer. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Vol. 15, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 251-264 
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• Islamic conference membership (OIC website3) 
• MNC PEN 1995 (UNCTAD) 
• public education expenditure per GDP 
• state interventionism (absence of economic freedom; Heritage Foundation and Wall Street 
Journal website for economic freedom4, 2000) 
• unequal transfer (calculated from UNDP, concept: ERDI, reciprocal value of comparative 
“price levels” (developed on the basis of the ERD-Index Yotopoulos et al.) (the Commission 
maintaining that a low price level is good result) 
 
 
The list of dependent variables to test the efficiency of the EU on cross-national level was long and 
multidimensional: 
 
 
Democracy 
 
Absence of democracy: political rights violations (Freedom House, 2000) 
 
Environment 
 
CO2 emissions per capita 
ESI-Index ((Yale/Columbia environment sustainability index project website) 
GDP output per kg energy use (“eco-social market economy”5) 
 
Gender development and gender empowerment 
 
female life expectancy 
female share of life years 
female share of suicide 
female suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants 
female unpaid family workers as % of all unpaid family workers 
gender empowerment (UNDP HDR 2005, data for 2003) 
maternal mortality ratio 
rapes per 100.000 women aged >15 y. 
teen-age mothers as % of all mothers 
 
Human development 
 
% immunization against measles 
% immunization against TB 
% infants with low birth-weight 
                                            
3 http://www.oic-oci.org/ there the icon “members”. In our sample, the following countries were coded as OIC member 
nations: Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, 
Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep. of, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mali, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Uzbekistan, Yemen. It is to be noted that 5 former members nations of the Soviet Union are included in the sample. 
4 http://www.freetheworld.com/; also: http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/. We used the latter website as the 
source of our data. It has to be kept in mind that the “worst” countries on the economic freedom scale have the numerically 
highest values, while the best countries have the numerically lowest values. Lao People's Dem. Rep. – the economically 
“unfreest” country in our sample, has the numerical value 4.6, while the economically freest country, Singapore, scores 1.45. 
We thus decided to call our indicator “state interventionism” 
5 This term is most probably an Austrian invention. The governing Conservative People’s Party – to be precise, its former 
Chairman Dr. Josef Riegler – seems to have invented this term in the late 1980s. For more on that debate: 
http://www.nachhaltigkeit.at/bibliothek/pdf/Factsheet11OekosozMarktw.pdf; and Michael Rösch, Tubingen University at 
http://tiss.zdv.uni-tuebingen.de/webroot/sp/spsba01_W98_1/germany1b.htm. As an indicator of the reconciliation between 
the price mechanism and the environment we propose the indicator GDP output per kg energy use; the term ‘eco-social 
market economy’ neatly grasps all the aspects of this empirical formulation 
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% people not expected to survive age 60 
Factor Social Development (Tausch, 2001b, calculated from 35 UNDP social indicators, SPSS factor 
analysis) 
human development index 
infant mortality rate 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 
TBC cases per 100.000 inhabitants 
 
Human security 
 
UNDP Conflict index (from UNDP Reducing Disaster Risk, 2004) 
UNDP DR Index^0, 5 (from UNDP Reducing Disaster Risk, 2004) 
UNDP HIV index (from UNDP Reducing Disaster Risk, 2004) 
 
Redistribution, growth and employment policies 
 
economic growth 1990-2003 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
 
Sustainability of social structures 
 
divorce rate as % of marriages 
homicide rate 
injuries and deaths from road accidents per 100.000 inhabitants and year 
juvenile convictions as % of all convictions 
 
In general terms, Tausch, 2006 explained development performance by the following standard 
multiple cross-national development research equation: 
 
(Equation 1) development performance 1990 - end 1990s = a1 +- b1*first part curvilinear function of 
development level +- b2*second part curvilinear function of development level +- b3.. . *stock of 
transnational investment per GDP (UNCTAD) mid 1990s +- b4.. . *unequal exchange (ERDI) +- b5.. . * 
foreign saving +- b6.. . * public education expenditures per GDP +-b7 * membership in the Islamic 
Conference +- b8 * European Union membership +- b9 * state interventionism  
 
Now, if globalization is good for the poor, it must be clear that the more globalized countries produced 
a better and more egalitarian development than the laggards in globalization, irrespective of the 
development level achieved. 
 
At this point and in view of the results confirmed in Tausch, 2006 it seems appropriate to recall here 
that Galtung’s original 1969 essay that started the quantitative debate on dependency and development 
was all connected to his theory of “structural violence”6. Galtung at that time was not interested in 
economic growth, but in “structural violence” which is occurring when life conditions of a partner in a 
systematic interaction are below levels which might be potentially experienced in a different, and 
more just global social order (i.e. the large majority segments of population living in poverty in the 
periphery, referred to in “critical peace research” as the “periphery of the periphery”, are subjected to a 
relationship of domination, wielded by the small and powerful elites in the Third World, which is part 
and parcel of the domination structure, commanded by the elites of the center over the entire global 
structure). The term “potential realizations”, introduced by “critical peace research” in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s is also important here, for it links life conditions to the level of development of the 
productive forces in society. We interpret this as nothing else but the residuals from the “plateau curve 
                                            
6 see also the article by Professor George Kent from the University of Hawaii at Manoa at 
http://www2.hawaii.edu/~kent/ANALYZ3.html  
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of basic human needs”, introduced by Joshua Goldstein in his article in “World Development”, 1985. 
Let us re-analyze in this context Galtung’s famous definition: 
 
“(…) the basic idea is that there is such a concept as "premature death." This we know, because we 
know that with some changes in social structure, in general and health structure in particular, life 
expectancy can be improved considerably. More particularly, it may be possible to give to the whole 
population the life expectancy of the class enjoying appropriate health standards, that is, the "upper 
classes." The level enjoyed by them would be an indicator of the potential possibility to "stay alive" in 
that society; for all but the upper classes that would be above the actual possibility to stay alive. The 
difference when avoidable, is structural violence”. (Galtung, 1969) 
 
“Violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental 
realizations are below their potential realizations (…) Violence is here defined as the cause of the 
difference between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance” 
(Galtung, 1969) 
 
“The structural violence is the sum total of all the clashes built into the social and world structures 
and cemented, solidified so that unjust, inequitable outcomes are almost unchangeable”. (Professor 
Johan Galtung, on his website at http://www.transcend.org/TRRECBAS.HTM) 
 
“violence as avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real 
level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially possible” (Wikepdia, the free Encyclopedia, 
article on “Structural violence” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_violence) 
 
 
Graph 2.1 immediately follows from the above quotations: 
 
 
Graph 2.1: structural violence in the world system and the plateau curve of basic human needs  
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The gaps in life expectancy development in relation to the non-linear trade-off with the level of 
productive forces are distributed in the following fashion in the countries of the world system: 
 
Structural violence in the world system, 2003
y = -1,2837x2 + 30,315x - 98,232
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Map 2.1: structural violence in the world system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: “bis” is the shorthand for “ranging from” “to”. Countries marked in green color: missing 
values 
 
LEX below trend curve 
LEX=a1+b1*ln(GDPPPPpc)-b2*(ln(GDPPPPpc))^2: UNDP 2005 
3,2 bis 34,9  
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Legend: “bis” is the shorthand for “ranging from” “to”. Countries marked in green color: missing 
values 
 
 
Our argument precisely is that it is not European Union integration as such, but the pro-globalist 
policies of the Commission, which create social imbalances and social stagnation in Europe. For the 
globalization -> poverty reduction school to be maintained, it must be shown that several indicators 
of globalization, and not just the indicator “share of foreign trade by GDP”, are significantly and 
systematically linked to a series of indicators of national and social well-being, including income 
redistribution, democracy, and sustainable development, irrespective of the development level 
achieved.  
 
Dependency and world system theory generally hold that poverty and backwardness in poor countries 
– like in Latin America and the Muslim world - are caused by the peripheral position that these nations 
have in the international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a 
stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the periphery. Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows: 
 
• there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the 
countries of the periphery and semi-periphery 
• this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and 
between them and the centers 
 
LEX below trend curve 
LEX=a1+b1*ln(GDPPPPpc)-b2*(ln(GDPPPPpc))^2: UNDP 2005 
3,2 bis 34,9  
-0,2 bis 3,2  
-2,2 bis -0,2  
-4,8 bis -2,2  
-12,9 bis -4,8  
structural violence 
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• this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery 
• this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations 
• these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the 
economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of 
inarticulateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979) 
 
It seems to be important to emphasize that the three indicators of dependency presented in Tausch, 
2006 measure three different types of “dependent development”:  
 
• MNC penetration measures the different degrees of weight that foreign capital investments 
have in the host countries 
• Unequal exchange (ERDI) measures the degree to which globalization has contributed to 
lowering the international price level of a country; i.e. it is an indicator about the openness of 
the price system vis-à-vis the pressures of globalization. The result of this is an unequal 
transfer from the peripheries to the centers, which used to be high-price countries 
• For dependency authors, foreign savings show the weight that foreign savings, mostly from 
the centers and richer semi-peripheries, have in the accumulation process of the host countries 
in the periphery and semi-periphery. 
 
In Tausch, 2006, the following significant determinants of world development are mentioned: 
 
 
Table 2.1.: the neoliberal and a “red-green” “neo-dependency” vision of global governance. The 
combined results from 9 predictors in 32 equations about development performance with 
complete data from 131 countries (t-values in the multiple regressions and directions of the 
influence) 
 
 
Only results with an error probability < 10% for the entire equation and for each coefficient are 
reported here 
 
 
Only results with an error probability < 10% for the entire equation and for each 
coefficient are reported here 
 
 
Variable name Islamic 
conference 
ln(GDP PPP 
pc) 
ln (GDP 
PPP pc)^2 
public 
education 
expenditur
e per GNP 
 
EU-15-
membershi
p 
(I-S)/GNP State 
interventio
ns 
MNC PEN 
1995 
unequal 
exchange 
F R^2 
human 
development 
index 
  1, 7982 -3, 9118  -3, 6062 5, 4932 -1, 8459  124, 51 91, 14 
Factor Social 
Development 
  3, 8250   -2, 9753 4, 4823 -3, 4343  67, 94 83, 48 
freedom from a 
high infant 
mortality rate 
   -2, 5287  -5, 2093 6, 6375 -2, 8128  59, 69 81, 74 
gender 
empowerment 
2, 1612   -4, 9143  1, 8106   2, 0601 30, 35 80, 84 
female life 
expectancy 
-2, 0437  2, 8556   -3, 0404 4, 2462 -2, 8861  36, 15 72, 89 
life expectancy, 
1995-2000 
-1, 7768  2, 6329   -2, 8596 4, 0480 -2, 4462  36, 02 72, 82 
freedom from 
high maternal 
mortality ratio 
  3, 2090   -2, 8784 3, 9088   25, 36 69, 32 
freedom from a 
high % of people 
not expected to 
survive age 60 
-2, 3239  2, 5138   -2, 9381 4, 0121 -1, 9224  26, 37 66, 23 
GDP output per 
kg energy use 
-1, 8417  1, 7083  -2, 3325 2, 6436 -2, 2948  1, 7276 17, 75 62, 46 
freedom from 
CO2 emissions 
per capita 
     -4, 6178 3, 9324  2, 0448 20, 56 62, 09 
freedom from 
political rights 
 -5, 1300 3, 0967 -4, 5592    -3, 8196  20, 33 60, 39 
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violations 
freedom from 
injuries and 
deaths from road 
accidents per 
100.000 
inhabitants and 
year 
  -2, 2598   -1, 8159    5, 95 59, 82 
freedom from a 
high rate of teen-
age mothers as % 
of all mothers 
 1, 6687  3, 4025  2, 9077 -2, 4432   10, 15 56, 27 
freedom from a 
high divorce rate 
as % of 
marriages 
-2, 2914  1, 8029       2, 53 40, 08 
% immunization 
against measles 
     -2, 7073 3, 2754 -1, 8790  8, 24 38, 80 
ESI-Index 2, 4963   -2, 4736      7, 20 38, 63 
freedom from a 
high UNDP HIV 
index 
-4, 7276   2, 2912    -3, 1272  5, 91 35, 64 
freedom from a 
high female share 
of suicide 
2, 2924  2, 8284   -2, 8247 2, 9074 -1, 7986  3, 57 33, 76 
freedom from a 
high rate of TBC 
cases per 
100.000 
inhabitants 
-3, 2381  2, 4324 3, 5694    -3, 1397  6, 55 32, 75 
            
freedom from a 
high income 
concentration - 
share of 
income/consumpt
ion richest 20% 
to poorest 20% 
   2, 4895 2, 7717 2, 6718 -2, 4264 -2, 0050  4, 36 30, 34 
female economic 
activity rate as % 
of male economic 
activity rate 
1, 7849   -2, 1630 3, 0411 4, 6097 -4, 7873 -2, 2703  5, 44 28, 81 
econ growth 
1990-2003 
-3,8610       3,9431  5,1906 28,36 
% immunization 
against TB 
     -1, 8319 2, 1406 -1, 7454 -2, 6754 4, 20 27, 41 
female share of 
life years 
  1, 9465   -1, 7262 2, 1694 -2, 4859  4, 52 25, 17 
freedom from a 
high UNDP 
Disaster Risk 
Index^0.50 
    -1, 9033     3, 02 19, 26 
Variable name Islamic 
conference 
ln(GDP PPP 
pc) 
ln (GDP 
PPP pc)^2 
public 
education 
expenditur
e per GNP 
 
EU-15-
membershi
p 
(I-S)/GNP State 
interventio
ns 
MNC PEN 
1995 
unequal 
exchange 
F R^2 
 
 
As one of the three main indicators of dependency, the reliance on foreign savings eases the 
distribution burden against the poorer segments of society during the accumulation process and it 
positively affects the gender relations in society and the efficiency of the eco-market economy, but it 
has several negative effects on a variety of other development processes, including the environment 
and human development. 
 
State interventionism increases the performance of countries under the Kyoto process and leads 
towards an improved human development, but it fails to resolve three basic issues: sexism, inequality 
and the eco-market efficiency of the economy. 
 
MNC penetration contributes to a higher economic growth, but it has negative consequences for 
human survival and life expectancy. In addition, an interesting phenomenon worthy of further research 
is the interconnection between decaying public services, decaying public transport and decaying 
public health services in the host countries of transnational investment on the one hand and the 
strategic policies of transnational corporations on the other hand, concentrated on the private sector, 
private transport, private medical services and the private automobile. The strengthening triple alliance 
between the MNCs, local capital and the state is a net result of the globalization process, and it still 
has dire social consequences – such as for social cohesion - as well. 
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Comparative “price levels” are, the Eurostat definition goes, the ratio between GDP at purchasing 
power parities (PPPs) and GDP at market exchange rates for each country. To quote Eurostat: 
 
“Comparative price levels are the ratio between Purchasing power parities (PPPs) and market 
exchange rate for each country. PPPs are currency conversion rates that convert economic indicators 
expressed in national currencies to a common currency, called Purchasing Power Standard (PPS), 
which equalises the purchasing power of different national currencies and thus allows meaningful 
comparison. The ratio is shown in relation to the EU average (EU-25 = 100). If the index of the 
comparative price levels shown for a country is higher/ lower than 100, the country concerned is 
relatively expensive/cheap as compared with the EU average.” (Quotation from Eurostat website, 
April 6, 2005, at:  
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1133,1406352,1133_1406373&_dad=portal&_sc
hema=PORTAL  
 
“Comparative price levels”, measure nothing else than the reciprocal value of our variable “unequal 
exchange” (ERDI). A country, following the Commission’s price reform strategy, is a country with a 
low international price level and a high ERDI. 
 
 
The empirical results for the effects of price reform are: a low international price level has positive 
effects on the Kyoto process and the eco-market efficiency of the economy, and a negative trade-off 
with the immunization against TB indicator for public health.  
 
As the Marxist classics and dependency theory have reminded us, capitalism is interested in 
appropriating the surplus value, and that means at higher stages of development always “the relative 
surplus value”. That means a standard of living that might be above absolute poverty levels, but that is 
still a polarized social structure that puts the needs of capital ahead of the needs of those millions of 
human beings around the globe that struggle for shelter, for freedom from qualitative and quantitative 
hunger, from oppression, and marginalization. Apart from that capital does not abolish all these 
contradictions that are deepening, like in the late 19th Century during its globalization, the politically 
highly conflictive international landscape of our globe. 
 
In the research design, presented in Tausch (2006), the most considerable positive effects by the 
European Union as such, not its present pro-globalization policies are the ones on the female 
employment share and on social cohesion, once you control for the other intervening variables.  
 
• female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
• freedom from a high income concentration - share of income/consumption richest 20% to 
poorest 20% 
 
The negative effects of the European Union are on the 2 social-environmental dimensions, the UNDP 
Disaster Risk Index and the eco-market economy: 
 
• freedom from a high UNDP Disaster Risk Index 
• GDP output per kg energy use 
 
It was shown in the analysis about world development since the 1980s, presented by Tausch (2006) 
that uncontrolled globalization leads to no end of the problem of structural violence. If we really 
want to achieve long-lasting breakthroughs in our quest for a “European social model”, we have to re-
consider the theoretical and practical implications of the “CEPAL/ECLAC” - alternative approach 
to global governance, and not simply rely on the forces of “world economic openness”. The 
synthesis of our empirical research results allows the hypothesis that the mobilization of internal 
savings and an active and stronger state, and less uncritical reliance on direct foreign investments, 
as was correctly foreseen by the early CEPAL/ECLAC-school (Flechsig St., 1984, Flechsig St., 1994, 
Flechsig St., 2000, Prebisch R., 1983, Prebisch R. 1986, Prebisch R. 1988a, Prebisch R. 1988b, Singer 
P. I. 1971), are still the most efficient tools of “global governance”.  
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High foreign savings increase the foreign control over the economy, with disastrous effects for the 
well-being of nations. We tested this proposition is successfully with our equations on 
 
freedom from a high infant mortality rate 
freedom from CO2 emissions per capita 
human development index 
female life expectancy 
Factor Social Development 
freedom from a high % of people not expected to survive age 60 
freedom from high maternal mortality ratio 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 
freedom from a high female share of suicide 
% immunization against measles 
% immunization against TB 
freedom from injuries and deaths from road accidents per 100.000 inhabitants and year 
female share of life years 
 
We also have shown that state sector controls have good effects for  
 
freedom from a high infant mortality rate 
human development index 
Factor Social Development 
female life expectancy 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 
freedom from a high % of people not expected to survive age 60 
freedom from CO2 emissions per capita 
freedom from high maternal mortality ratio 
% immunization against measles 
freedom from a high female share of suicide 
female share of life years 
% immunization against TB 
 
A high foreign capital penetration increases the foreign control over the economy, with disastrous 
effects for the well-being of nations, i.e. on: 
 
freedom from political rights violations 
Factor Social Development 
freedom from a high rate of TBC cases per 100.000 inhabitants 
freedom from a high UNDP HIV index 
female life expectancy 
freedom from a high infant mortality rate 
female share of life years 
life expectancy, 1995-2000 
female economic activity rate as % of male economic activity rate 
freedom from a high income concentration - share of income/consumption richest 20% to poorest 20% 
freedom from a high % of people not expected to survive age 60 
% immunization against measles 
human development index 
freedom from a high female share of suicide 
% immunization against TB 
 
A high exchange rate deviation index constitutes a precondition for unequal exchange which has 
disastrous effects on  
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% immunization against TB 
 
 
3. Globalization and development – some second thoughts 
about the basic pro-globalization strategy of the EU 
 
 
Challenging conventional pro-globalist EU-Commission thinking, we start by the certainly 
provocative assertion that a thorough re-analysis of existing data suggests that development by free 
trade is a myth. Much of the re-ascent of Europe and Japan after 1945 was due to import substitution. 
When that ended, Europe and Japan began to slide back again vis-à-vis the United States, thus re-
affirming the old wisdom of development history research in contrast to “pure” free trade economic 
theory (Senghaas, 1985). Senghaas’ analysis of the development history of European states today finds 
its confirmation in global development statistics summarized by the United Nations (2002). Indeed, 
one of the most important legitimate points of critique against the current neo-liberal consensus should 
be that the history of capitalist development must not remain in darkness, and that its recurrent crises 
and depressions and wars should always be kept present. 
 
Much of the free trade 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century witnessed a European decline 
vis-à-vis the US, and only the import substituting and regulated postwar period after 1945 saw a 
relative closing the gap that began to widen again after 1973. 
 
The late Andre Gunder Frank has implied for a long time that Europe’s quest to catch up with the US 
by 2010 has to be seen in the larger perspective of Asia’s re-ascent in the world system. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLAC/CEPAL, in its essay “Globalización y 
desarrollo” (2002)7 provided estimates that support such a view that stresses the simultaneousness of 
the ascent of Asia from the 1950s onwards with the decline of Europe after 1973 in the world system: 
 
Table 3.1.: The evolution of the gap between Europe and the US since 1820 (real GDP per 
capita, United States = 100 for each year since 1820) 
 
 
GDP per capita in … 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1990 1998 
 
Western Europe (in % 
of the US, AUS, NZ, 
CND) 
102, 60 81, 20 66, 10 49, 50 71, 30 71, 50 68, 50 
United States, Australia, 
NZ, CND 
100, 00 100, 00 100, 00 100, 00 100, 00 100, 00 100, 00 
Japan (in % of the US, 
AUS, NZ, CND) 
55, 70 30, 30 26, 40 20, 70 70, 70 84, 00 78, 10 
Asia (excl. Japan) (in % 
of the US, AUS, NZ, 
CND) 
47, 90 26, 50 12, 20 6, 80 7, 60 9, 50 11, 20 
Latin Amer & Car. (in 
% of the US, AUS, NZ, 
CND) 
55, 40 28, 70 28, 70 27, 50 28, 00 22, 60 22, 20 
Eastern Europe + 
former USSR (in % of 
the US, AUS, NZ, 
CND) 
55, 50 37, 70 28, 60 28, 00 35, 40 28, 80 16, 70 
Africa (in % of the US, 
AUS, NZ, CND) 
34, 80 18, 30 11, 10 9, 20 8, 40 6, 20 5, 20 
 
                                            
7 http://www.eclac.cl/cgi-
bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/6/10026/P10026.xml&xsl=/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/MDG/tpl/top-bottom.xsl 
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Source: our own calculations from CEPAL/ECLAC 
 
Usually, world systems theories maintain that the present ongoing era of globalization already has its 
parallel in the 19th Century. The UN CEPAL/ECLAC data neatly demonstrate that these epochs of 
globalization in the 19th Century and after 1973 shifted incomes relatively away from Western Europe, 
Eastern Europe and Japan and in favor of the United States and the “dominions”, while the era of 
regulation after 1945 (Arrighi, 1995) clearly re-allocated relative incomes to the West Europeans, to 
the East Europeans and the Japanese. Latin America also gained during the era of import substitution 
from around 1930 to around 1973. 
 
It is to be expected that Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and also Japan that all owed their 
relative ascent in global society after 1945 to their import substitution strategies, will be the main 
losers during the ongoing globalized decades. Re-analyzing existing ILO data for the 1990s also 
clearly shows that the winners and losers of globalization were indeed distributed very unevenly 
around the globe: 
 
Table 3.2: The social effects of globalization, 1990 – 1999 
 
 
absolute and 
relative values 
Millions of people < 
1 $ a day 1990 
% pop < 1 $ a day 
1990 
Millions of people < 
1 $ a day 1999 
% pop < 1 $ a day 
1999 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
486 30, 5 279 15, 6 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
6 1, 4 24 5, 1 
South Asia 506 45 488 36, 6 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
48 11 57 11, 1 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
5 2, 1 6 2, 2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 241 47, 4 315 49 
Total 1292 29, 6 1169 23, 2 
     
absolute and 
relative values 
Millions of people < 
2 $ a day 1990 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
1990 
Millions of people < 
2 $ a day 1999 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
1999 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
1114 69, 7 897 50, 1 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
31 6, 8 97 20, 3 
South Asia 1010 89, 8 1128 84, 8 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
121 27, 6 132 26 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
50 21 68 23, 3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 386 76 480 74, 7 
Total 2712 62, 1 2802 55, 6 
     
1990 = 100 Millions of people < 
1 $ a day 
% pop < 1 $ a day Millions of people < 
2 $ a day 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
57, 4 51, 1 80, 5 71, 9 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
400 364, 3 312, 9 298, 5 
South Asia 96, 4 81, 3 111, 7 94, 4 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
118, 8 100, 9 109, 1 94, 2 
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Middle East and 
North Africa 
120 104, 8 136 111 
Sub-Saharan Africa 130, 7 103, 4 124, 4 98, 3 
Total 90, 5 78, 4 103, 3 89, 5 
     
changes since 1990 Millions of people < 
1 $ a day 
% pop < 1 $ a day Millions of people < 
2 $ a day 
% pop < 2 $ a day 
 
 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
-207 -14, 9 -217 -19, 6 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
+18 +3, 7 +66 +13, 5 
South Asia -18 -8, 4 +118 -5 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
+9 +0, 1 +11 -1, 6 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
+1 +0, 1 +18 +2, 3 
Sub-Saharan Africa +74 +1, 6 +94 -1, 3 
Total -123 -6, 4 90 -6, 5 
 
Legend: based on Tausch, 2004 – 2005, calculated with ILO data. Source: our own calculations from ILO sources, 2003 
(Report of the Director-General: “Working out of Poverty”. International Labor Conference 91st Session 2003, ILO, Geneva) 
 
 
Thus, the final balance of globalization since 1990 was the income impoverishment of Eastern Europe 
and the Muslim world in the Middle East and North Africa. The wave of global politics and economics 
in the 1990s negatively affected the social balances in many countries. In a significant portion of the 
countries of the globe, inequality and globalization – the inflow of foreign direct investments per host 
country GDP - are on the increase since 1980, as the present author could confirm in his recent works 
based on the data series of the ILO, the UTIP project at the University of Texas, and the World Bank. 
These analyses of the dynamics in the world system calculated the time series correlations of 
globalization, economic growth (Global Development Network Growth Database, William Easterly 
and Mirvat Sewadeh, World Bank), unemployment (Laborsta ILO), and inequality (UTIP, University 
of Texas Inequality Project, Theil indices of inequality, based on wages in 21 economic sectors).  
 
 
 
Table 3.3: the success and failure of globalization since 1980 on a global level 
 
 
globalization and 
its effects – world 
sample with 
complete data 
states that fulfilled 
the criterion  
states that did not 
fulfill the criterion
total number of 
states with 
complete data 
% of states 
meeting the 
promises of 
globalization 
 
rising foreign 
direct investment 
inflows 
78 10 88 88, 6 
sinking 
comparative price 
levels8 
66 25 91 72, 5 
accelerating 
economic growth 
60 28 88 68, 2 
sinking 
unemployment 
38 53 91 41, 8 
sinking inequality 19 69 88 21, 6 
 
                                            
8 always defined here as 1/ERDI (ERDI is the exchange rate deviation index, being equal to GDP PPP/ GDP exchange rate) 
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the success and failure of globalization since 1980 on the level of the EU-25 
 
 
globalization and 
its effects – EU-25 
sample with 
complete data 
 
states that fulfilled 
the criterion 
states that did not 
fulfill the criterion
total number of 
EU-25 states with 
complete data 
% of states 
meeting the 
promises of 
globalization 
sinking 
comparative price 
levels 
21 2 23 91, 3 
rising foreign 
direct investment 
inflows 
21 2 23 91, 3 
accelerating 
economic growth 
19 4 23 82, 6 
sinking 
unemployment 
10 13 23 43, 5 
sinking inequality 5 18 23 21, 7 
 
Legend: based on Tausch, 2004 – 2005, calculated with World Bank, ILO, and UTIP data 
 
 
 
4. Why a new “Vienna Consensus” is necessary. Europe 
after the French riots and the Latin Americanization of the 
“old continent”. 
 
 
 
In this Chapter, we show that Europe’s crisis is not caused by what the neo-liberals term a “lack of 
world economic openness” but rather, on the contrary, by the enormous amount of passive 
globalization that Europe – together with Latin America – experienced over recent years.  
 
 
4.1. Introduction – the lost Lisbon race 
 
 
On all accounts, the EU-25 is the most important formalized regional bloc in the world economy: 
 
 
Table 4.1: The comparative shares of Europe, the US and Japan in world economic activities 
 
 
EU-25 USA 
 
 
Japan 
% of world population 7, 2 4, 6 2 
% of world GDP 22 21 7 
% of world trade 19, 5 17, 4 6, 7 
% of world inward investments 25, 7 31, 3 1, 3 
% of world outward investments 46, 1 24, 8 5, 3 
economic openness (foreign trade with third countries 
as % of GDP) 
14, 6 8, 8 9 
 
Source: Eurostat Press Releases, Publications Office European Commission, Economist Country 
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Briefings 
 
For years, Europe is engaged in the so-called Lisbon process (named after the European Summit in 
2000 at which these policy measures were discussed) to catch up with the US and to become by 2010 
the most advanced, technology and science-based economy in the world. The failure to meet these 
Lisbon goals has now been generally recognized. But the time-perspective tells us another and very 
different story.  
 
 
Table 4.2: changes in shares of world GDP, measured in real purchasing power parities, 1980 – 
2003 according to ECOFIN 14954/05 of November 25th, 2005 
 
 
Country grouping Share in world 
GDP, 1980 in % 
 
Share in world 
GDP, 2003 in % 
% DYN in 23 
years 
 
% DYN p.a. 
Other states 34 25 -9 -0, 692 
EU-25 26 22 -4 -0, 308 
Russia 4 3 -1 -0, 077 
Japan 7 7 0 0, 000 
Brazil 3 3 0 0, 000 
USA 20 21 1 0, 077 
India 3 6 3 0, 231 
China 3 13 10 0, 769 
 
 
Over the last quarter of a Century, the EU-25, together with Russia and a great number of smaller and 
medium powers in Latin America, Africa, and West Asia lost shares of world GDP in the global race, 
while China, India, and the United States were on the winning side, and Japan and Brazil kept their 
shares. Europe has grown bigger only by extension, adding more and more members to the original 
community of 6 countries, while at the same time the share of today’s 25 nations faced a rather sharp 
decline in their share of world GDP since 1980. Undoubtedly, there was some convergence within the 
EU-25 group, but the group as a whole is in dramatic decline. 
 
Eurostat, the statistical apparatus of the European Commission, closely monitors these developments 
in the framework of the “Lisbon process” but – as European decision makers increasingly concede 
today – the results of this race up to now were rather dismal for the Europeans, especially the countries 
of the Euro-zone, comprising the 12 European Union nations that introduced a joint, single Currency.  
 
Our following empirical calculations are all based on Eurostat and its website at 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1090, 30070682, 
1090_33076576&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. 
 
Graph 4.1 shows the results of this lost race as measured by real purchasing power: 
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Graph 4.1: The “Lisbon race” for Europe to catch up by 2010 with the United States – real 
purchasing power 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP per capita in PPS  
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), (EU-25 = 100) 
 
By now, practically all European decision makers are well aware of these facts. In their diagnosis as to 
how to cure these ills, most of them would assume that Europe, in order to catch up, must further 
globalize and flexibilize its labor and product markets. However, a thorough re-analysis of the existing 
data shows that America, paradoxically enough, did not globalize as rapidly as the EU-25 over the last 
10, 15 years. It was Europe that radically globalized over the last decade and a half, with rather mixed 
results in terms of growth, jobs, and “social cohesion” at best, and an increasing stagnation and social 
polarization at worst. 
 
The following graphs and tables analyze the trajectory of rapid globalization in Europe over the last 
decades by international comparison.  
 
Our combined measure of the velocity of the globalization process, presented for the first time in 
Tausch, 2006, is of a UNDP-Indicator type, combining three different dimensions on a uniform scale, 
ranging from 0 (lowest value) to 1 (highest value). It is based on the increases of capital penetration 
over time, on the increases of economic openness over time, and on the decreases of the comparative 
price level over time i.e. multiplying the three dimension/component indices by 1/3 in the calculation 
of the final index and adding them together, and calculating each dimension index by the formula: 
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     Actual value – minimum value 
(1) dimension index =       ------------------------------------------- 
     Maximum value – minimum value 
 
 
(2) globalization index =  1/3 * (DYN capital penetration index) + 1/3 * (DYN openness index) + 1/3 
(DYN Price Level index) 
 
In Tausch, 2006, the Dyn Capital Penetration Index is based on the residuals of the standard OLS 
linear regression of the UNCTAD shares of cumulated foreign direct investment per GDP in 2000 on 
those in 1995; the Dyn Openness Index is based on the residuals of the standard OLS linear 
regression of the UNDP foreign trade shares in 2003 on those in 1993, and the DYN Price Level 
Index 1998 – 2002 is based on the changes in the Eurostat Price level indicator. For the aims of this 
analysis, we compared market exchange rate GDPs and purchasing power parities GDPs across the 
globe using UNDP HDR data for 1998 (US = 100) and 2002 (US = 100).  
 
The following map on world price levels (US = 100), shows dramatically how the US remained to be a 
high price level country, while the Europeans took the message of globalization very seriously and 
radically reduced comparative price levels in comparison to the United States of America. 
 
The ratio for the US in 1998 and in 2002 was fixed at 100 each. Countries moving towards the status 
of high price countries, like Mexico or Eastern Europe, are plotted in dark colors, while countries 
becoming rapidly low price countries (like most of the European nations or Latin America) are 
plotted in light colors.  
 
 
 
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales  www.caei.com.ar  
International Relations Theory Program 
 23
 
 
 
Map 4.1: movements in comparative price levels, 1998 – 2002. The Europeans, Latin Americans, 
Australians, Japanese and South Africans were the “best pupils” in the “globalization 
classroom” 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: countries with missing values are marked in green colors 
 
 
Eurostat concept
US 1998/2002 = 100; -> US DYN = 0
1,9 bis 23,5  (33)
-3  bis 1,9  (28)
-7,2 bis -3   (35)
-14,4 bis -7,2  (32)
-59,7 bis -14,4  (33)
DYN PRICE LEVEL
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Map 4.1 (continued): movements in comparative price levels, 1998 – 2002. The Europeans, Latin 
Americans, Australians, Japanese and South Africans were the “best pupils” in the 
“globalization classroom” 
 
 
 
 
Legend: see maps above 
 
 
Properly taking into account that rises in the price level are a movement away from globalization, and 
falling price levels are a movement towards globalization, Tausch (2006) finally interprets the 
combined indicator results about the velocity of globalization in the following way: the United States, 
Mexico, Venezuela, larger parts of Africa and large sections of West and South Asia escaped from the 
combined pressures of globalization, while Eastern and Southern Latin America, very large parts of 
Europe, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Thailand and Malaysia, Russia and China were characterized by a 
specially high tempo of globalization. 
 
 
 
Eurostat concept
US 1998/2002 = 100; -> US DYN = 0
1,9 bis 23,5  (33)
-3  bis 1,9  (28)
-7,2 bis -3   (35)
-14,4 bis -7,2  (32)
-59,7 bis -14,4  (33)
DYN PRICE LEVEL
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Map 4.2: The velocity of globalization: the combined effects of core capital penetration increase, 
1995 – 2000, openness increase, 1993 – 2003 and the lowering of international price levels as 
compared to the United States, 1998 - 2002 
 
 
 
Countries with missing values are marked in green colors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNDP HDR type dyn globalization
index comb. DYN MNC PEN, price level, openness
0,435 bis 0,964  (30)
0,372 bis 0,435  (28)
0,339 bis 0,372  (29)
0,301 bis 0,339  (26)
0,16  bis 0,301  (32)
DYN GLOBALIZATION
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Map 4.2 (continued): The velocity of globalization: the combined effects of core capital 
penetration increase, 1995 – 2000, openness increase, 1993 – 2003 and the lowering of 
international price levels as compared to the United States, 1998 - 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries with missing values are marked in green colors  
 
 
 
UNDP HDR type dyn globalization
index comb. DYN MNC PEN, price level, openness
0,435 bis 0,964  (30)
0,372 bis 0,435  (28)
0,339 bis 0,372  (29)
0,301 bis 0,339  (26)
0,16  bis 0,301  (32)
DYN GLOBALIZATION
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Map 4.2 (continued): The velocity of globalization: the combined effects of core capital 
penetration increase, 1995 – 2000, openness increase, 1993 – 2003 and the lowering of 
international price levels as compared to the United States, 1998 - 2002 
 
 
 
Countries with missing values are marked in green colors  
 
 
4.2. Europe’s social performance by global and Latin American standards 
 
 
In the face of such challenges, it is small wonder that European politicians call for a radical, far-
reaching debate. To quote the Social Affairs Minister of the Council Presidency nation during the first 
part of the second half of 2005, United Kingdom, David Blunkett9: 
 
The European social model does not have to be abandoned but it must be adapted to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century, David Blunkett said today. The work and pensions secretary said it was 
vital that the EU "learn the lessons of change" if it was to meet the economic challenge posed by India 
and China and the problems posed by a shrinking working age population and the subsequent pension 
problems. Speaking in the wake of last week's meeting of employment and social affairs ministers in 
Belfast, Mr. Blunkett said this meant getting people into work and raising the skills and productivity of 
the working population. At the start of Britain's six-month presidency of the EU, foreign secretary 
Jack Straw said the government was committed to finding a way to reconcile economic progress and 
social justice, denying there needed to be a choice between the two. Today Mr. Blunkett restated this 
idea, urging European ministers to enter a wide-ranging debate on how the social model could be 
                                            
9 Secretary David Blunkett has meanwhile resigned. At the time of writing this analysis (November 2005), the new Secretary 
is the Rt. Honourable John Hutton M. P. 
UNDP HDR type dyn globalization
index comb. DYN MNC PEN, price level, openness
0,435 bis 0,964  (30)
0,372 bis 0,435  (28)
0,339 bis 0,372  (29)
0,301 bis 0,339  (26)
0,16  bis 0,301  (32)
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modernised in the run-up to a special European council meeting in the autumn. "We do not want to 
abandon the European social model, but if it is to be sustained it must meet the challenges of the 21st 
century, particularly those of demography and globalisation, " he said. "We need to learn the lessons 
of change and manage the process to deal with people's fears and recognise the challenges we face 
such as those of India and China." (http://www.politics.co.uk/foreign-policy/blunkett-eu-social-model-
must-reform-$16137621.htm) 
 
 
Although many different attempts to quantify social developments have been published in the past, no 
single, globally available measure is as common today as the United Nations “Human Development 
Index” (HDI). The last data series with far reaching implications for the European social policy debate 
was released in the global “Human Development Report”, 2005. Comparing the performances of the 
nations of the world, as measured by the UN Human Development Index, we arrive at a picture which 
fairly supports the logic referred to above in the political statement by the former British Work and 
Pensions Secretary, the Rt. H. David Blunkett, M.P.  
 
The human development index (HDI), as it is well-known, measures the average achievement of a 
country in basic human capabilities. The HDI indicates whether people lead a long and healthy life, 
are educated and knowledgeable and enjoy a decent standard of living. The HDI examines the average 
condition of all people in a country: distributional inequalities for various groups of society have to be 
calculated separately. The HDI is a composite of three basic components of human development: 
longevity, knowledge and standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy. Knowledge is 
measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and mean years of schooling (one-
third weight). Standard of living is measured by purchasing power, based on real GDP per capita 
adjusted for the local cost of living (purchasing power parity, or PPP) 
(http://www.adb.org/Statistics/Poverty/H.asp#hdi).  
 
To rigorously assess the European social performance, Tausch (2006) compared the performances of 
the nations of the world from 1995 to 2003. Map 4.3 presents the results about the changes in the 
world HDI ranks, 1995 – 2003. This map gives an insight into the dynamics of world social 
development during the period of intensive globalization. There were thus impressive gains for the 
world semi-periphery and equally impressive losses for some countries of the world center: 
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Map 4.3: gains in world human development ranks, 1995 - 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. Nations marked in green color, like Greenland, Libya, Angola, Somalia 
and Iraq, have missing data. Dark shades indicate a good performance. 
 
 
Both the United States as well as several “old European” nations lost (as well as many nations in 
Africa), while China, South-East Asia, several Middle Eastern and North African countries, as well as 
several Latin American countries considerably improved their performance during the period 1995 – 
2003. 
 
 
 
gains/losses world HDI ranks
1995-2003
4 bis 18  (35)
1 bis 4  (34)
0 bis 1  (15)
-3 bis 0  (28)
-34 bis -3  (33)
gains world HDI ranks
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Map 4.3 (continued): gains in world human development ranks, 1995 – 2003 (gains in world 
human development ranks in the “wider Europe”, 1995 – 2003) 
 
 
 
 
Legend: see map above. Dark shades indicate a good performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
Nations on the geographical periphery of Europe, like Iceland, Ireland, and several new East 
European member countries of the European Union improved their position over the last 8 years, 
while the “old center” of the European Union and the United Kingdom had a very unsatisfactory 
performance. 
 
 
For the special purposes of European Union, Council of Europe and Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe policy making, we re-arranged the evidence of Table 4.3 in a new map that was 
drawn only at the level of European states: 
 
 
 
gains/losses world HDI ranks
1995-2003
4 bis 18  (35)
1 bis 4  (34)
0 bis 1  (15)
-3 bis 0  (28)
-34 bis -3  (33)
gains world HDI ranks
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Map 4.4: gains in world human development ranks in Europe, 1995 - 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: see maps above. Dark shades indicate a good performance. 
 
 
4.3. The end of social cohesion in Europe and Latin America as we know it 
 
 
Provocative, as such comparisons might be it can also be shown that especially the “wider Europe” of 
the EU-25 is not too distantly away from the social realities of the more advanced Latin American 
countries. Table 4.3 shows the results of such a UNDP-indicator-oriented comparison EU-25, Latin 
America and the Caribbean and the MEDA partner countries of the European Union: 
 
gains/losses in world HDI rank
1995 - 2003 (UNDP)
6 to 18  (9)
1 to 6  (8)
0 to 1  (3)
-2 to 0  (7)
-7 to -2  (9)
HDI success 1995 - 2003
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Table 4.3: Social cohesion in the EU-25, in Latin America and the Caribbean, and in the MEDA 
partner countries of the European Union 
 
 
 
criterion Which Latin American and Caribbean 
countries outperform worst performing EU 
nation? 
Which Arab 
MEDA EU-
partner countries 
outperform worst 
performing EU 
nation? 
 
worst EU-25 
nation 
value for 
worst EU-
25 nation 
value for 
the US 
human 
development 
index 
Barbados, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica 
 Latvia 0, 836 0, 944 
inequality 
between richest 
20 % and 
poorest 20 % 
Jamaica Egypt, Jordan, 
Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia 
Portugal 8 8, 4 
life expectancy 
at birth 
Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba, Dominica, 
Uruguay, Mexico, Barbados, Panama, 
Argentina, Ecuador, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Saint Lucia, Belize 
Libya, Tunisia, 
Syria, Lebanon 
Latvia 71, 6 77, 4 
probability at 
birth of 
surviving to age 
65, female 
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Uruguay, Panama, 
Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador 
Tunisia, Syria, 
Libya 
Latvia 81, 9 86, 7 
probability at 
birth of 
surviving to age 
65, male 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Panama, Mexico, 
Barbados, Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina, 
Venezuela, Belize, Saint Lucia, Paraguay, 
Colombia, Saint Vincent, Peru, Jamaica, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Trinidad & Tobago, 
Honduras, Suriname, Brazil, Bahamas, 
Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Guatemala 
Syria, Tunisia, 
Algeria, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Morocco, 
Egypt 
Estonia 57, 2 79, 1 
ratio of 
estimated 
female to male 
earned income 
Jamaica, Bahamas, Barbados, Uruguay, 
Panama, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, El Salvador, Brazil, 
Venezuela, Guyana, Chile, Mexico, 
Honduras, Costa Rica, Argentina, 
Dominican Republic 
Morocco, Tunisia Austria 0, 35 0, 62 
real income of 
the poorest 20 
% in purchasing 
power parities 
none  Latvia 3749 10142 
gender 
development 
index 
Barbados, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay  Latvia 0, 834 0, 942 
gender 
empowerment 
measure 
Bahamas, Costa Rica, Argentina, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Barbados, Mexico, Panama, 
Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Peru, 
Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador 
 Malta 0, 486 0, 793 
 
 
Pretty much the sample results emerge from a systematic comparison of the data contained in the 
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP)10. The time series correlations for the years 1980 – 
99 from the data base about the Theil Index of Inequality, 1963 – 99 show that in the majority of the 
countries of the European Union there was a sharp increase in inequality rates from the 1980s 
onwards. The UTIP data collections contain, among others, two very important data series for the 
study of international economic inequalities. UTIP- UNIDO is a global data set that calculates the 
industrial pay-inequality measures for 156 countries from 1963-1999. It has a total of 3194 
                                            
10 http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/ 
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observations based on the UNIDO Industrial Statistics. The EHII data base from the UTIP project 
(Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set (EHII)) - is a global dataset, derived from the 
econometric relationship between UTIP-UNIDO, other conditioning variables, and the World Bank's 
Deininger & Squire data set. The data set EHII2 has 3, 179 observations, while the data set EHII4 has 
3, 126 observations. 18 of the 25 member countries of the European Union have a time series 
correlation of 0.75 or higher between the Theil coefficient of inequality (multiplied by 100) and the 
time axis, i.e. inequality rises very sharply with time. 
 
On its website, the European Commission states: 
 
“Following the introduction by the Amsterdam Treaty (Article 136 and 137) of the fight against social 
exclusion among the Union Objectives, the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 asked Member 
States and the European Commission to take steps to make a decisive impact on the eradication of 
poverty by 2010. Building a more inclusive European Union was thus considered as an essential 
element in achieving the Union's ten year strategic goal of sustained economic growth, more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion” (quotation from the GD Employment, Social Affairs and 
Equal Opportunities, available at 
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_inclusion/index_en.htm) 
 
The quantitative evidence however points into quite another direction, i.e. Europe is characterized by 
often extremely rising income inequality rates and the disappearance of social inclusion in all 
European Union member countries, candidate and accession countries except Lithuania and 
Denmark: 
 
Table 4.4: rising and falling inequality in the world system  
 
 
Europe (EU-29) 
 
 
 rising inequality falling inequality 
 
Gini > 50 none 
 
none 
Gini 40 - 
49.9 
Turkey, Greece 
 
none 
Gini 30 - 
39.9 
Finland, Hungary, Portugal, Poland, 
Slovakia, United Kingdom, France, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Bulgaria, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Malta, 
Austria, Italy, Croatia, Cyprus  
 
Lithuania, Denmark 
Gini < 29.9 Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, Czech R. 
 
none11 
 
 
Entire world system 
 
 
 rising inequality falling inequality 
 
Gini > 50 Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, Papua New 
Guinea, Mozambique, Malawi, Burundi, 
Guatemala, Kuwait, Lesotho, Trinidad & 
Tob., Jamaica, Qatar, Ghana, Mongolia, 
Oman, Armenia 
 
Liberia, Uganda, Togo 
                                            
11 the discontinued data series for the two parts of Germany were not interpreted here 
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Gini 40 - 
49.9 
Yugoslavia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, 
Ecuador, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Venezuela, Panama, Egypt, 
U.S.S.R./ Russia, Mexico, Azerbaijan, 
Suriname, Iraq, Philippines, Zambia, 
Tunisia, Central African Rep, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Greece, Puerto Rico, Pakistan, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Turkey, Colombia, Albania, 
Argentina, Israel, Ethiopia, Tanzania, El 
Salvador, Zimbabwe, Barbados, Honduras, 
Botswana, Bolivia, Peru, Madagascar, 
Senegal, Kyrgyz Rep, Rwanda, Syrian Arab 
Republic, Myanmar (Burma), Yemen, Rep., 
Dominican Rep. 
 
Eritrea, Nicaragua, Swaziland, India, Morocco, Chile, 
Tonga, Haiti, Fiji, Jordan, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Afghanistan, Costa Rica, Nepal, Kenya, Sri Lanka, 
Mauritius, Indonesia 
Gini 30 - 
39.9 
Australia, Finland, Hungary, Portugal, 
China, Hong Kong, Poland, Slovakia, 
United Kingdom, France, Ukraine, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Moldova, 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Macedonia, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, 
Malta, Austria, Japan, Norway, United 
States, Seychelles, Italy, Algeria, Croatia, 
Iran, Taiwan, Cyprus 
 
Lithuania, Denmark, Singapore, Korea, Iceland, Cuba 
Gini < 29.9 Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, Macao, Czech 
R. 
 
none 
 
 
Closely connected to the tendencies of rising inequality is the trend towards rising unemployment. 
Only Cyprus, Denmark, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Korea Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Thailand, United Kingdom, and the United States had a low unemployment rate (< 5 %) that 
still fell over time, while Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Estonia, Greece, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Trinidad&Tob., Tunisia, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela all had an unemployment rate of 10 % or above that rose over time.  
 
 
Table 4.5: unemployment - tendencies in the world system 
 
 
EU-29 unemployment unemployment rising over time, 1980-
2001 
 
unemployment falling over time, 
1980 - 2001 
below 5 % Austria, Sweden, Luxembourg Cyprus, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, Portugal 
5 % to 10 % France, Germany, Italy, Finland, Czech 
Republic 
Hungary, Turkey, Slovenia, 
Belgium, Romania 
10 % to 15 % Spain, Greece, Estonia Latvia 
15 % to 20 % Poland, Slovakia, Croatia Bulgaria, Lithuania 
> 20 % none none 
LAC unemployment   
below 5 % none Mexico, Honduras 
5 % to 10 % Belize, Peru, Brazil El Salvador, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Barbados 
10 % to 15 % Trinidad&Tob., Colombia, Panama, 
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador 
none 
15 % to 20 % Uruguay, Argentina none 
> 20 % none none 
European Neighbors 
unemployment 
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below 5 % Azerbaijan, Belarus none 
5 % to 10 % Russian Fed., Egypt Moldova 
10 % to 15 % Ukraine Morocco, Georgia, Serbia 
15 % to 20 % Tunisia, Albania none 
> 20 % Algeria none 
other countries 
unemployment 
  
below 5 % Singapore, China, Switzerland, Norway Malaysia, United States, Iceland, 
Thailand, Korea Republic 
5 % to 10 % New Zealand, Australia, Israel, Japan, 
Indonesia 
Canada 
10 % to 15 % none none 
15 % to 20 % none none 
> 20 % South Africa none 
 
 
Our world maps clearly support the view that in terms of human survival, Europe for a long time has 
ceased to be a “center” country, and long ago has started to re-become a periphery. From the 
viewpoint of world systems theory, especially from the angle of the “Re-Orient” sub-school, initiated 
by the late Andre Gunder Frank, this is not a coincidental movement along the historic ups and downs 
of social indicators, perhaps to be explained in addition by the devastating long-term effects of the 
social transformation crisis in the East, but the very symptom of a much more deeper-rooted crisis, 
which is the beginning of the real re-marginalization and re-peripherization of the European continent 
[after the interval of European ascent, which according to Andre Gunder Frank only lasted from 1750 
to the last quarter of the 20th Century, and which interrupted the millennia of Chinese dominance in the 
world economy]: 
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Map 4.5: female survival probability to age 65 
 
 
 
Legend: dark shades indicate a good performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
 
 
 
probability survival to age 65
UNDP 2005
88,1 bis 93,7  (33)
81,3 bis 88,1  (35)
73,6 bis 81,3  (34)
50,7 bis 73,6  (34)
12  bis 50,7  (34)
% prob. survival 65 fem. 
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Map 4.5 (continued): female survival probability to age 65 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: dark shades indicate a good performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
probability survival to age 65
UNDP 2005
88,1 bis 93,7  (33)
81,3 bis 88,1  (35)
73,6 bis 81,3  (34)
50,7 bis 73,6  (34)
12  bis 50,7  (34)
% prob. survival 65 fem. 
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Map 4.6: male survival probability to age 65 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: dark shades indicate a good performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
 
 
 
 
probability survival to age 65 
UNDP 
79,8 bis 87,4  
71 bis 79,8  
60,3 bis 71  
44,7 bis 60,3  
9,3 bis 44,7  
% prob. survival 65 male 
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Map 4.6 (continued): male survival probability to age 65 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: dark shades indicate a good performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most visible and clear-cut indicators of mass poverty are the gender-specific probabilities at 
birth of surviving to age 65. The UNDP neatly documents these two data sets on its statistical 
website (http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/). While 90 % or more female persons in Hong Kong 
(China (SAR), best placed territory of the world), Japan, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Cyprus, Australia, 
Greece, Israel, Sweden, Iceland, Finland, France, Austria, Canada, Singapore, Norway, Germany, 
Belgium, Malta, Korea, Rep. of, Portugal, and the United Arab Emirates survive to age 65, the United 
States ranks only 41 among 170 countries of the world, and Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Uruguay, 
Panama, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador outperform the worst placed country of the present 
EU-25, Latvia (rank 64 of global society). Also the Mediterranean partner countries of the EU, i.e. 
Israel, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt, easily outperform Latvia. 
 
Even worse, male survival rates to age 65 in many EU-25 countries really correspond to those of 
developing countries. While 80 % or more of male persons in Iceland (best placed country of the 
 
probability survival to age 65 
UNDP 
79,8 bis 87,4  
71 bis 79,8  
60,3 bis 71  
44,7 bis 60,3  
9,3 bis 44,7  
% prob. survival 65 male 
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world), Hong Kong (China (SAR)), Sweden, Japan, Australia, Israel, Switzerland, Malta, Canada, 
United Arab Emirates, Norway, Brunei Darussalam, Italy, Singapore, Cyprus, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Spain, Greece, 
Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Albania, and Cuba survive to age 65, the US is ranked only 
35th of world society, and the worst ranked EU-25 country, Estonia, is only placed 116th of all 170 
classified countries of the world. Other very poor performances in the EU-25 are reported from Poland 
(rank 72), the Slovak Republic (rank 73), Romania (rank 88), Hungary (rank 89), Lithuania (rank 
101), and Latvia (rank 104). Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Panama, Mexico, Barbados, Uruguay, Ecuador, 
Argentina, Venezuela, Belize, Saint Lucia, Paraguay, Colombia, Saint Vincent, Peru, Jamaica, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, Trinidad & Tobago, Honduras, Suriname, Brazil, Bahamas, Dominican 
Republic, Bolivia, Guatemala often easily outperform the worst-ranked EU-25 country, Estonia, just 
as the Mediterranean partner countries Israel, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, and 
Egypt outperform Estonia.  
 
 
If our line of argument, which applies Andre Gunder Frank’s reasoning about a long-term structural 
crisis of Europe, is correct, then other indicators should support the argument as well. And indeed they 
do. Materials, presented in Tausch, 2006, show that 
 
• combined ratios of trends towards human misery (unemployment, inequality, stagnation) 
are very strong in most European countries 
• absolute poverty rates in the US and in Europe are comparable 
• poverty rates in the European periphery cannot be measured in relative terms alone (i.e. 
the famous Eurostat measure which specifies the risk-of-poverty rate as defined by the share 
of persons with an equivalized disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which 
is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income (after social transfers)). 
Bringing in absolute income levels (see point above), it indeed emerges that poverty in the 
US and in the European periphery is comparable 
 
The next question, which arises in such a context then is the question as to whether figures on income 
inequality and economic growth do support the arguments, just explained. Is there a tendency towards 
stagnation, and towards inequality, which supports the argument put forward by Andre Gunder Frank 
about a more long-term structural crisis of the “European model”? 
 
 
4.4. A tale of inequality and growth 
 
 
Well, first of all we have to analyze in this context the hypothesis of a growing semi-peripherization 
of the European continent by looking at the aggregate figures of economic inequality and stagnation 
for the contemporary period. Although levels of present-day inequality in Latin America and in 
Europe are still different from one another, it has to be noted that the gap between the rich and the 
poor (the top 20 % and the bottom 20 %) in the following European nations is already 5.0 or bigger: 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Poland, France, Latvia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Ireland, 
Greece, Israel, Italy, Estonia, United Kingdom, Turkey, and Portugal. In Portugal12, this gap is 
already 8.0, while in the US it is now at 8.4. In historical terms (see below) both most of the European 
nations and the US moved away from the welfare capitalism of the 1960s. An interesting point for 
world system theory debates is of course, whether or not China, under global capitalism and enormous 
foreign capital inflows, repeats the experience of Brazil in the late 1960s and early 1970s – an 
economic “miracle” combined with increasing economic and social inequalities. 
 
 
                                            
12 Portugal is the country of origin of the actual President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durao Barroso. Before 
becoming Commission President, he was the Prime Minister of his home country. Generally, his policies as Prime Minister 
were associated with neo-liberal economic reforms. 
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Map 4.7: quintile ratios in the world system 
 
 
 
Legend: dark shades indicate a bad performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
 
 
top 20%/bottom 20%
UNDP 2005
18,1 bis 57,6  (18)
12  bis 18,1  (12)
9,7 bis 12   (12)
7,9 bis 9,7  (12)
6,9 bis 7,9  (12)
6,1 bis 6,9  (10)
5,4 bis 6,1  (14)
4,9 bis 5,4   (9)
4,4 bis 4,9   (9)
3,4 bis 4,4  (16)
quintile ratio
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Map 4.7. (continued): quintile ratios in the world system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: dark shades indicate a bad performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
 
top 20%/bottom 20%
UNDP 2005
18,1 bis 57,6  (18)
12  bis 18,1  (12)
9,7 bis 12   (12)
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6,1 bis 6,9  (10)
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Map 4.7 (continued): quintile ratios in the world system 
 
 
 
 
Legend: dark shades indicate a bad performance. “bis” shorthand for “ranging from … to”. 
 
It is evident that the very essence of the “European social model” that meant a high living standard, 
and high prices in the tradable and non-tradable sector, is increasingly at risk. The absolute center of 
the debate about the “European social model” is the social-Keynesian conviction that was perhaps best 
formulated by the former Minister of Finance of Sweden and General Director of Social Policies at the 
European Commission, Dr. Allan Larsson, and now President of the University of Lund in his home 
country. Dr. Larsson reiterated on many occasions his belief (for example at 
http://www.globalprogress.org/ingles/seminarios/larsson.html) that  
 
 
• Europe’s current account surplus at that time was a sign of economic strength; while America 
has a secular current account deficit 
• high gross social expenditures provide an ideal framework for subsequent high productivity 
growth rates; i.e. Europe with its strong social safety nets has ideal chances for faster 
productivity growth than the United States  
 
There are different ways to look at the empirical record. While there are those who maintain that most 
recent developments have pulled away the carpet beneath such beliefs, there is strong counter-
evidence to the contrary. The Eurostat data series on social protection levels and productivity already 
confirm this; there is a positive correlation which explains more than 16 % of productivity levels 
between social protection and productivity (Tausch, 2006). Critics might say that this does not take 
into account global changes in productivity that disproportionally favor the Asian economies. Social 
Keynesians would now argue that these relationships also hold on a global level (our own 
compilations, based on ILO and World Economic Forum. These data are downloadable from: 
http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Gcr/Growth_Competitiveness_Index_2003_Comparisons and 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/socfas/research/stat/table14.htm ). 
top 20%/bottom 20%
UNDP 2005
18,1 bis 57,6  (18)
12  bis 18,1  (12)
9,7 bis 12   (12)
7,9 bis 9,7  (12)
6,9 bis 7,9  (12)
6,1 bis 6,9  (10)
5,4 bis 6,1  (14)
4,9 bis 5,4   (9)
4,4 bis 4,9   (9)
3,4 bis 4,4  (16)
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The contrary of what critics of the social welfare state assume is true: social protection levels and 
world economic competitiveness have a clear positive trade-off, and the correlation between the two 
variables is extremely high, in fact social protection levels explain more than ½ (i.e. 52 %) of world 
economic competitiveness: 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.2: social protection levels and world economic competitiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
The empirical realities suggest that Europe, more and more, leaves behind these preconditions of 
successful economic development. The intensive globalization that Europe experienced points in the 
direction of globalization not leading to more equality, at least as suggested by the available new 
evidence under survey here. Available indicators indicate that the European continent experienced 
over the last years a real radical neo-liberal globalization and transformation, while the benefits of this 
transformation are rather mixed. In our following Table, EU-25 member countries are underlined.  
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Table 4.7: EU-25 – global best practice in globalization, global worst practice rates of decreasing 
social well-being? 
 
“Best practice” globalizers: European among the world’s top 30 globalizers (correlation over time of the rates of 
inflows of foreign direct investment per GDP) 
 
Poland; France; Portugal; Costa Rica; Croatia; Pakistan; China; Israel; Latvia; Uganda; Moldova; Russian Federation; 
Slovak Republic; Romania; Lithuania; Mongolia; India; Chile; Azerbaijan; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Austria; 
Belgium; Denmark; Turkey; Armenia; Hungary; Venezuela; RB; Nepal; Germany 
 
“Best practice” reduction of the comparative price level (US=100): Europeans among the world’s top 30 reducers of 
the price level (see Chapter below) 
 
Luxembourg; Equatorial Guinea; Argentina; Singapore; Brazil; Switzerland; Denmark; Germany; Austria; France; 
Uzbekistan; Hong Kong; China (SAR); Uruguay; Belgium; Japan; Netherlands; Sweden; Finland; Italy; Croatia; Paraguay; 
Australia; Lesotho; Rwanda; Greece; Norway; New Zealand; South Africa; Tajikistan; Peru; Chile 
 
But worst practice rises in inequality: European among the world’s top 30 increases in inequality 
 
China; Slovak Republic; Nigeria; Czech Republic; Bangladesh; Gambia; The; Spain; Hungary; Panama; Australia; Latvia; 
Romania; Egypt; Arab Rep.; Gabon; Mexico; Venezuela; RB; Philippines; Moldova; Bulgaria; Pakistan; New Zealand; 
Netherlands; Japan; Slovenia; Tunisia; Turkey; Azerbaijan; Ireland; Portugal; Poland; Malawi 
 
Worst practice long-term tendency towards stagnation: Europeans among the world’s top 30 in slow long-term 
economic recovery; measured by the time series correlation of economic growth rate over time 
 
Pakistan; Burundi; Japan; Moldova; Russian Federation; Bulgaria; Egypt; Arab Rep.; Romania; Indonesia; Mongolia; 
Zimbabwe; Kenya; Thailand; Jordan; Italy; Cyprus; Colombia; Latvia; Malaysia; Algeria; South Africa; Gambia; The; 
Kyrgyz Republic; Singapore; Brazil; Zambia; Lithuania; Turkey; New Zealand; Norway; Czech Republic 
 
Worst practice tendency towards unemployment: Europeans among the world’s top 30 with unemployment is rising 
over time (time series correlation of ILO Laborsta unemployment rates over time) 
 
Mauritius; Haiti; South Africa; Tajikistan; Azerbaijan; Estonia; Croatia; Indonesia; Namibia; Algeria; Argentina; Greece; 
Czech Republic; Ukraine; Saudi Arabia; Brazil; Luxembourg; Philippines; Bangladesh; Pakistan; Japan; Uzbekistan; 
Slovakia; Albania; Uruguay; Egypt; Ecuador; Nicaragua; Russian Federation; Finland; Israel 
 
 
 
Using the University of Texas Inequality Project data series on inequality in the world system since 
the 1960s, based on solid pay data, we arrive at the following world map of time series correlations 
with inequality. The real explosion of pay inequality in the European East has to be noted. Still, the 
share of the poorest 20% in total incomes in the US is lower than in most European countries (except 
in the former USSR, see our data based on UNDP sources). Eastern Europe was the region which 
most rapidly globalized and which had the most rapid tendency towards inequality at the same 
time: 
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Map 4.8: the growth of inequalities in the 1990s in the world system and in the wider Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our own calculations from UTIP13. In this and in all other maps in this work, “bis” is the shorthand for “ranging 
from … to”. Countries painted in green color: missing data. Dark colors indicate a bad performance 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
13 http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/  
time-series correlation with
UTIP-data
0,89  bis 1   (20)
0,68  bis 0,89   (22)
0,16  bis 0,68   (21)
-0,48  bis 0,16   (22)
-1,01  bis -0,48   (23)
The growth of inequalities, 90s
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Map 4.8 cont.: the growth of inequalities in the 1990s in the world system and in the wider 
Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: our own calculations from UTIP14. In this and in all other maps in this work, “bis” is the shorthand for “ranging 
from … to”. Countries painted in green color: missing data. Dark colors indicate a bad performance 
 
 
These tendencies are also responsible for the very high extent of absolute poverty to be encountered on 
the European periphery and semi-periphery. As we already mentioned, the usual Eurostat measures of 
poverty that fix poverty levels at national relative poverty lines (i.e. poor = < 60 % of median 
equivalent per capita income of national societies) do not tell us much about the absolute income 
levels of the poor. If we define poverty as an equivalent income which is below the level of 60 % or 
less of the median equivalent income of the entire EU-15, we already are confronted with the 
following staggering poverty rates on the outer rims of the EU-15: 
 
                                            
14 http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/  
time-series correlation with
UTIP-data
0,89  bis 1   (20)
0,68  bis 0,89   (22)
0,16  bis 0,68   (21)
-0,48  bis 0,16   (22)
-1,01  bis -0,48   (23)
The growth of inequalities, 90s
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Table 4.8: poverty in Europe (EU-15) 
 
 
a) % of people living in poverty, 2001: 
 
 
 EUROZONE-
12 
 
 B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL A P FIN S UK EU15T 
2001 19  8 5 7 44 31 13 22 28 1 11 7 50 16 14 14 17 
2000 18  8 5 7 41 32 14 25 24 1 8 6 49 16 14 15 17 
1999 18  7 4 7 43 36 11 23 25 2 8 8 49 14 11 16 17 
1998 19  8 4 8 44 38 11 23 27 1 8 8 52 11 12 15 18 
1997 20  8 3 8 45 39 13 27 28 1 9 8 51 10 10 14 18 
1996 20  8 4 8 46 39 12 27 28 1 11 7 51 9 : 15 19 
1995 21  9 4 11 46 39 12 29 28 2 10 7 51 : : 16 20 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations from unpublished Eurostat surveys 
 
 
b) Changes in the percentage of people, living in poverty, EU-15, 1997 - 2001 
 
 
 2001 1997 Increase/decrease of 
poverty rates 
 Below 60% of EU-
15-median 2001 – 
8253€ 
 
Below 60% of EU-
15-median 1997 – 
6789 € 
1997-2001 
 
FIN 16 10 6 
S 14 10 4 
DK 5 3 2 
NL 11 9 2 
B 8 8 0 
F 13 13 0 
I 28 28 0 
L 1 1 0 
UK 14 14 0 
D 7 8 -1 
EL 44 45 -1 
A 7 8 -1 
P 50 51 -1 
EU15 17 18 -1 
EUROZONE12 19 20 -1 
IRL 22 27 -5 
E 31 39 -8 
 
Legend: our own compilations from unpublished Eurostat surveys 
 
Our materials all confirm the broader picture – that poverty in Europe emerges as a much more serious 
problem, when we abolish the incorrect assumption that absolute income levels do not matter. Another 
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way to look methodologically correctly at these dynamics is to compare the absolute real per capita 
purchasing power level of the poorest 20 % across the globe: 
 
 
Table 4.9: World poverty (n = 124 countries with complete UNDP 2005 data)  
 
 
real per capita 
income, 
poorest 20 % in 
$ and PPP in 
2003 
EU-29 European 
Neighborhood 
Program 
 
Balkan LAC Western 
democracies
other countries 
< 1000 $  Georgia, 
Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Rep, 
of, Tajikistan 
 Brazil, Nicaragua, 
Colombia, Panama, 
Peru, Venezuela, El 
Salvador, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Bolivia, 
Paraguay, Honduras
 Botswana, Vietnam, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Guinea, Lao 
People's Dem, Rep, , Swaziland, Ghana, 
Rwanda, Cameroon, Papua New Guinea, 
Zimbabwe, Mauritania, Nepal, Senegal, 
Mongolia, Gambia, Namibia, Uganda, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Mozambique, Yemen, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, 
Mali, Tanzania, U, Rep, of, Madagascar, 
Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, 
Malawi, Zambia, Central African 
Republic, Niger, Sierra Leone 
 
1000 - 2000  Turkmenistan, 
Egypt, Jordan, 
Azerbaijan, 
Morocco, 
Armenia 
 
 Uruguay, Argentina, 
Dominican Republic, 
Chile, Mexico, 
Jamaica 
 South Africa, Iran, Islamic Rep, of, Sri 
Lanka, Indonesia, India, China, 
Philippines 
2000 - 3000 Romania, Bulgaria, 
Turkey 
Kazakhstan, 
Belarus, 
Ukraine, 
Tunisia, 
Algeria 
Macedoni
a, TFYR, 
Bosnia 
and 
Herzegov
ina, 
Albania 
 
Trinidad and 
Tobago, Costa Rica 
 Thailand, Malaysia 
3000 - 4000 Latvia Russian 
Federation 
 
    
4000 - 5000 Lithuania, Croatia, 
Poland, Estonia 
 
     
5000 - 6000 Slovakia, Portugal
 
     
6000 – 7000 Hungary 
 
   Israel Singapore 
7000 – 8000 Greece    New Zealand Hong Kong, China (SAR), Korea, Rep, of
 
> 8000 $ Ireland, Finland, 
Denmark, Austria, 
Sweden, Germany, 
Belgium, 
Netherlands, 
France, Italy, 
Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, Spain, 
United Kingdom 
 
   Norway, 
Japan, 
Canada, 
Switzerland, 
United States, 
Australia 
 
 
Legend: our own compilations from UNDP Human Development Report, 2005 
 
 
These differences in real purchasing power of the poorest 20 % in the different groups of countries 
deserve our further attention – with the integration of the European Periphery into the larger European 
“whole”, Europe becomes more and more similar to the developing regions, especially in Latin 
America and the Muslim Mediterranean. The radical consequence to be drawn from such comparisons 
is that European social policies more and more have to become “European development policies”. 
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4.5. Multivariate results about the global Lisbon contest 
 
 
It is no wonder then that debates in Europe intensify. More government, less government, more 
privatization, less privatization, more globalization, less globalization? Who, in the end, is to 
blame for this crisis? With the Social Keynesian European consensus politically in retreat, a new 
catchword has entered the European political scene – globalization. Is globalization to blame for the 
supposed ills of the “European Model?” As Roger Cohen put it in the International Herald Tribune on 
August 24, 2005: 
 
“In no major European country have politics remained as frozen since the Cold War's end as in 
France, where the old guard has proved largely impervious to the remaking of the world. Britain got 
New Labour and Tony Blair with their slick market-oriented makeover of a tired socialism. In Spain, 
Felipe González's elegant refashioning of the left helped lay the basis for post-Franco democracy. (…) 
(…) Mitterrand deployed the rhetoric of the left to mobilize his Socialist Party and then operated 
largely from the center. Chirac's Gaullism has similarly placed suspicion of the market and the United 
States at the heart of his discourse, and led him to govern from a nebulous centrist perch. The result is 
a paradox: a country more attached to ideological debate than any other in Europe, yet operating in 
an environment where "left" and "right" are often almost meaningless labels and where governance 
tends to consist of saying one thing - the state is a force for good - while trying to do another - 
privatize. Running France is above all a conjuring trick. It is perhaps because the art of the illusionist 
has lain at the center of French politics since 1945 - beginning with the depiction of wartime events 
and the Vichy regime - that it has been easier to maintain the various illusions that have preserved this 
country's strange political status quo. But, as the political season begins again in France after the 
summer break, there are signs of increasing strain. To the left and right, pressures are growing for 
clearer political positions that would offer the French at least the semblance of a real choice between 
distinct ideas. (…) Michel Rocard, a former Socialist prime minister, put the situation bluntly in a 
recent interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, saying it was time to "cast Marxist dialect into the trash 
can" and calling a growing leftist force in the country, the antiglobalization movement known as 
Attac, "a monument to economic and political stupidity."  His comments had a ring to them. But the 
fact is Attac has attracted 30, 000 members in its seven years of existence. Its message that American-
driven capitalism, known here as neo-liberalism, is making the world more unequal and more unjust 
has proved compelling. If the "Non" campaign triumphed in the referendum on a European 
constitution, it was partly because Attac and the forces of the left around it managed to portray the 
document as a paean to neo-liberalism. This coalition of the "Non" continues to hold sway, ensuring 
that the looming battle to define French socialism will not naturally lead down the same market-
oriented path adopted by other European parties of the left. "The experience of hundreds of millions of 
people has been the failure of globalization and Anglo-Saxon capitalism, which has accentuated 
inequalities, dismantled systems of social protection and increased unemployment, " said Jacques 
Nikonoff, the president of Attac. "These processes can be reversed." (Roger Cohen, International 
Herald Tribune, available at: http://www.iht.com/protected/articles/2005/08/23/news/globalist.php)  
 
 
Our final multivariate model takes both the possible short-term dynamic effects of the increases of 
foreign direct investment and the long-term stagnation effects of MNC penetration into account. In 
addition to the quantitative effects of the dependent variables used in Chapter 2 of this study, we 
introduce DYN MNC PEN, 1995 – 2000, into the equations. We test the effects of these independent 
variables on DYN Human Development, the increases or decreases of world Human Development 
ranks and economic growth.  
 
To correct for trends in the entire world economy, we calculated the increases/decreases of the human 
development index (DYN HDI, 1995 – 2003) by the residuals from the linear OLS regression 
predicting the HDI 2003 on the HDI 1995 (Tausch, 2006). 
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In order to test the dynamic relevance of the dependency model proposed by Volker Bornschier and 
Chris Chase Dunn in 1985, based on MNC penetration and its increases over time, we calculated our 
multiple regressions for 3 development dimensions – economic growth, DYN Human Development 
ranks in global human development performance, and the volaitility of growth rates compared for the 
period 1975 – 2003 and 1990 – 2003 (simple differences): 
 
(2) development performance = a1 +- b1*first part curvilinear function of development level +- 
b2*second part curvilinear function of development level +- b3.. . *stock of transnational investment 
per GDP (UNCTAD) mid 1990s +- b4.. . *unequal exchange (ERDI) +- b5.. . * foreign saving +- b6.. . * 
public education expenditures per GDP +-b7 * membership in the Islamic Conference +- b8 * 
European Union membership +- b9 * state interventionism+- b10 * DYN transnational investment 
per GDP (UNCTAD) 1995-2000 
 
Our final multivariate model takes both the possible short-term dynamic effects of the increases in the 
reliance on foreign direct investment and the long-term stagnation effects of MNC penetration into 
account. In addition to the quantitative effects of the dependent variables, we introduced DYN MNC 
PEN, 1995 – 2000, into the equations. We test the effects of these independent variables on DYN 
Human Development (increases or decreases of world human development ranks, 1995 - 2003), the 
vulnerability of economic growth (formulation real per capita income economic growth rate 1975 – 
2003 minus real per capita income economic growth rate 1990 - 2003) and economic growth 1990 – 
2003.  
 
The original expectation expressed by Volker Bornschier throughout his quantitative work that MNC 
penetration leads to short-term dynamics and long-term stagnation, is by and large confirmed again by 
Table 4.10. Peadar Kirby’s expectation that globalization increases the vulnerability and volaitility of 
the development process is fully vindicated in our study: 
 
 
Table 4.10: the dynamic aspects of dependence, DYN MNC penetration and world development 
– Bornschier re-vindicated  
 
 
 (I-S)/GNP State 
intervention
s 
EU-
membershi
p 
Islamic 
conference 
MNC PEN 
1995 
public 
education 
expenditure 
per GNP 
unequal 
exchange 
ln(GDP PPP 
pc) 
ln (GDP PPP 
pc)^2 
DYN MNC 
PEN 
(residuals) 
constant 
growth 
1990-2003  
-0,0285 -0,0645 2,2035 0,3817 -0,4643 0,0346 -0,1252 0,8993 -0,0194 0,0315 -11,76867 
 0,0077 0,1774 2,8575 0,2399 0,1034 0,0084 0,4717 0,6969 0,4417 0,0161 11,2294 
 0,3808 1,9820          
 6,8269 111,0000          
 268,1884 436,0516          
t-test and 
direction of 
influence 
-3,6803 -0,3634 0,7711 1,5913 -4,4913 4,1038 -0,2655 1,2904 -0,0440 1,9520  
t-test and 
direction of 
influence^2 
13,5447 0,1321 0,5947 2,5324 20,1722 16,8413 0,0705 1,6651 0,0019 3,8105  
t-test and 
direction of 
influence^0
,5 
3,6803 0,3634 0,7711 1,5913 4,4913 4,1038 0,2655 1,2904 0,0440 1,9520  
degrees of 
freedom 
111,0000 111,0000 111,0000 111,0000 111,0000 111,0000 111,0000 111,0000 111,0000 111,0000  
error 
probability 
0,0004 0,7170 0,4423 0,1144 0,0000 0,0001 0,7911 0,1996 0,9650 0,0535  
F equation 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269 6,8269  
error 
probability, 
entire 
equation 
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000  
 (I-S)/GNP State 
intervention
s 
EU-
membershi
p 
Islamic 
conference 
MNC PEN 
1995 
public 
education 
expenditure 
per GNP 
unequal 
exchange 
ln(GDP PPP 
pc) 
ln (GDP PPP 
pc)^2 
DYN MNC 
PEN 
(residuals) 
constant 
better or 
worse HDI 
rank, 
1995-2003 
-0,0014 0,8054 -10,5959 1,4887 -1,4662 -0,0506 3,6557 -0,0257 0,1754 0,1169 33,108373 
 0,0252 0,5671 9,1382 0,7796 0,3282 0,0273 1,5239 2,2738 1,4275 0,0525 35,9264 
 0,2506 6,4690          
 3,8131 114,0000          
 1595,6909 4770,6611          
t-test and 
direction of 
influence 
-0,0548 1,4201 -1,1595 1,9096 -4,4672 -1,8568 2,3989 -0,0113 0,1229 2,2270  
t-test and 0,0030 2,0166 1,3445 3,6467 19,9558 3,4476 5,7547 0,0001 0,0151 4,9597  
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direction of 
influence^2 
t-test and 
direction of 
influence^0
,5 
0,0548 1,4201 1,1595 1,9096 4,4672 1,8568 2,3989 0,0113 0,1229 2,2270  
degrees of 
freedom 
114,0000 114,0000 114,0000 114,0000 114,0000 114,0000 114,0000 114,0000 114,0000 114,0000  
error 
probability 
0,9564 0,1583 0,2487 0,0587 0,0000 0,0659 0,0181 0,9910 0,9024 0,0279  
F equation 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131 3,8131  
error 
probability, 
entire 
equation 
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001  
 (I-S)/GNP State 
intervention
s 
EU-
membershi
p 
Islamic 
conference 
MNC PEN 
1995 
public 
education 
expenditure 
per GNP 
unequal 
exchange 
ln(GDP PPP 
pc) 
ln (GDP PPP 
pc)^2 
DYN MNC 
PEN 
(residuals) 
constant 
vulnerable 
growth (diff 
1975-2003 
minus 
1990-2003) 
0,0121 -0,0017 -0,0581 -0,2628 0,0883 -0,0014 -0,4006 -0,6093 0,1485 -0,0261 0,3160713 
 0,0051 0,1204 1,9608 0,1592 0,0681 0,0056 0,3163 0,4459 0,3098 0,0105 7,8322 
 0,2093 1,2445          
 2,5154 95,0000          
 38,9583 147,1358          
t-test and 
direction of 
influence 
2,3893 -0,0138 -0,0297 -1,6505 1,2972 -0,2603 -1,2667 -1,3662 0,4795 -2,4702  
t-test and 
direction of 
influence^2 
5,7086 0,0002 0,0009 2,7241 1,6827 0,0678 1,6044 1,8666 0,2299 6,1019  
t-test and 
direction of 
influence^0
,5 
2,3893 0,0138 0,0297 1,6505 1,2972 0,2603 1,2667 1,3662 0,4795 2,4702  
degrees of 
freedom 
95,0000 95,0000 95,0000 95,0000 95,0000 95,0000 95,0000 95,0000 95,0000 95,0000  
error 
probability 
0,0189 0,9891 0,9764 0,1021 0,1977 0,7952 0,2084 0,1751 0,6327 0,0153  
F equation 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154 2,5154  
error 
probability, 
entire 
equation 
0,0064 0,0064 0,0064 0,0064 0,0064 0,0064 0,0064 0,0064 0,0064 0,0064  
 (I-S)/GNP State 
intervention
s 
EU-
membershi
p 
Islamic 
conference 
MNC PEN 
1995 
public 
education 
expenditure 
per GNP 
unequal 
exchange 
ln(GDP PPP 
pc) 
ln (GDP PPP 
pc)^2 
DYN MNC 
PEN 
(residuals) 
constant 
 
 
Legend: In this and in all following tables, very small decimal numbers are abridged according to established mathematical 
conventions, contained in the EXCEL routine. For example, a number 0, 000141972 will be abridged to 1E-04, i.e. a decimal 
number rounded to 0, 0001 and starting at the fourth number after the decimal point with three zeros after the comma. A 
number 9E-10 equals thus a decimal number with 9 zeros after the comma, i.e. 0, 0000000009. All our EXCEL 7.0 
calculations are from UNDP and other data sources, quoted above. As in all EXCEL 7.0 outprints, first row: un-standardized 
regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, second last row: t-Test and direction of the influence; last row: error 
probability. The values immediately below the standard errors are R^2 (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom 
(fourth row). Below that: ss reg; ss resid, i.e. the sum of squares of the regression and the sum of squares of the residuals. The 
right-hand entry in the third row is the standard error of the estimate y. 
 
 
5. The explosive issue of regional inequality in Europe, the 
“Bolkestein” (services) directive and the reversal of the 
Balassa/Samuelson effect 
 
 
Ongoing analyses shatter the belief that Europe is a world apart from the rising poverty and inequality 
that many people associate with American capitalism. While undoubtedly there is poverty and 
inequality on a rising scale in many countries of the world system, it would be wrong to attribute these 
tendencies to any specific “American/Americanized character” of the US or the European economy. It 
might be true that 70 percent of all of the income growth in the United States during the 1980s went to 
the richest 1 percent of all families (Michael Yates15, Monthly Review, February 2004). In terms of 
                                            
15 http://www.monthlyreview.org/0204yates.htm 
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real income development however, evidence presented by Deborah Reed from the Public Policy 
Institute California seems to suggest16 that only in California there was an absolute impoverishment of 
the bottom 25%, while the other 49 US states saw a real increase in the incomes of even the poorest 
25% from 1969 to 2002. Most recent analyses in many European countries, including Austria, on the 
other hand seem to suggest that from 1992 to 2004 even the real median worker and employee 
incomes have decreased, in Austria from 1444 € (1808 $) in 1992 to 1370 € in 2004 (1716 $; Prof. 
Alois Guger, Austrian Institute for Economic Research, as quoted by Michael Bachner, Der Standard, 
Print-Ausgabe, 31.7. /1.8.2004).  
 
Serious comparisons of the inequality of personal incomes in Europe and in the United States 
always maintained that even for the EU-15, the level of income inequality is quite high, when we take 
the huge income differences between the European states and intra-country or inequality between the 
regions into account at the same time. Summing up the results of the famous “Sapir Report” that for a 
time was available from the website of the European Commission under 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/lisbon_strategy/pdf/sapir_report_en.pdf we arrive at the following figures: 
 
 
Table 5.1a GINI Income Inequality in the EU-15 and in the United States of America, duly 
considering intra- and inter-national income inequality in Europe and intra- and inter-state 
inequality in the United States of America 
 
 
 1985  1995 
 
 
 GINI before 
Taxation  
GINI after 
Taxation  
 
GINI before 
Taxation  
GINI after 
Taxation  
EU 0,381 0,279 0,408 0,294 
USA 0,415 0,337 0,421 0,342 
 
Source: our own calculations from „Sapir Report“ on behalf of the European Commission 
 
The regional concentration (GINI-coefficient) of value added in the EU-15 in mid 1990s was, 
according to Aiginger and Leitner, 0.5106 and 0.5374 in the US, with very a slight decrease of 
regional inequality taking place between 1987 and 1995 in both systems. The same holds true for 
employment, where the GINI coefficient was 0.4762 in Europe and 0.5232 in the United States. No 
such calculations exist for the EU-25 as yet. 
 
 
Table 5.1b GINI Inequality measures in the EU-15 and in the United States of America, duly 
considering intra- and inter-national income inequality in Europe and intra- and inter-state 
inequality in the United States of America 
 
 
 EU-15 
 
US US inequality above EU 
inequality in % 
 
GINI incomes 
after taxes 
 
0,2940 0,3420 16,33 
GINI regional 
employment 
 
0,4762 0,5232 9,87 
GINI regional 
i
0,5106 0,5374 5,25 
                                            
16 http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/CC_204DRCC.pdf  
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incomes 
 
 
Source: see text above 
 
Normally, neo-classical economics would expect a leveling-off process to take place between the 
poorer and the richer regions in a common market area. The richer the region, the slower the economic 
growth rate, while poorer regions should rush ahead and grow more rapidly than the rich ones. Ideally, 
economic growth should be an inverse function of income per capita. But the latest data from 
InfoRegio, the Commission’s regional planning bureau, dispel such an assumption as a myth: 
 
Graph 5.1a: There is no real convergence between rich and poor regions - The Commission 
graph 
 
 
 
 
Source: quoted from 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/study_en.htm  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/repor_en.htm and  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/slides/slides_en.htm  
 
 
If anything, economic growth increases with levels of regional per capita income. Youth 
unemployment decreases with income per capita levels, but the function is not linear. The R^2 
explained is 33 %.  
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Graph 5.1b: There is no real convergence between rich and poor regions – our own graph with 
Commission data 
 
 
Regional economic growth and average income level in Europe
y = 2E-06x3 - 0,0005x2 + 0,0514x + 1,0857
R2 = 0,0274
-4,00
-2,00
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Source: calculated from the EXCEL regional data file, provided by InfoRegio, European Commission. Please note that here 
the x-axis is the AVERAGE income level for the 1990s and the early 2000s (regional income per capita in % of the EU-25 
average). 
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Graph 5.1c: There is no real convergence between rich and poor regions – average income level 
and youth unemployment according to Commission data 
 
 
 
Average income level and youth unemployment in Europe
y = 1E-05x3 - 0,0022x2 - 0,1117x + 37,215
R2 = 0,3321
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Source: calculated from the EXCEL regional data file, provided by InfoRegio, European Commission. Please note that here 
the x-axis is the AVERAGE income level for the 1990s and the early 2000s (regional income per capita in % of the EU-25 
average). 
 
 
 
Our following maps, all based on InfoRegio, portray the dynamics of regional underdevelopment in 
Europe after the accession and enlargement process already took place. There were certain shifts in 
economic growth, to be sure, that corrected the initial center-periphery structure, but these shifts were 
not general, and they were accompanied by a tremendous employment problem and by a very 
considerable marginalization among young people, negatively shaping the life perspectives of parts of 
an entire generation: 
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Map. 5.1: Huge differences in real purchasing power 
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Map 5.2: Apart from the centers Ireland, S-England, Stockholm, Helsinki, Amsterdam, 
Brussels, Madrid and the Basque Country: economic growth clearly shifts to the some dynamic 
centers in the European semi-periphery 
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Map 5.3: There is no real convergence between rich and poor regions - The Lisbon employment 
targets – far away 
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Map 5.4: Unemployment – the biggest challenge to the European social model 
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Map 5.5: Youth unemployment in Europe 
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Map 5.6: Unemployment rates 
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Map 5.7: Early school leavers 
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Established economics teaches us that for such gaps to be bridged, a process of convergence sets in 
that was described by Bela Balassa and Paul Samuelson, independently from each other, more than 4 
decades ago, and which is called ever since the “Balassa-Samuelson effect” (see Falkinger, 2006). 
Components of, say, electricity plants in rich and poor countries will be traded on the world market at 
about the same, high world market prices, while a haircut in a rich country will be much more 
expensive than a haircut in a poor country. For economists, these huge differences of price levels in 
the non-tradable sectors are usually interpreted as the real reason of the welfare differences between 
the rich and the poor countries. Under these conditions, Balassa and Samuelson observed, the poor 
country has one main possibility: raising the level of wages in the non-tradable sector. Since a large 
part of the non-tradables depend in one way or the other on the government (social services etc.), a 
rising budget deficit will be one of the main negative consequences of the catching-up process. The 
real appreciation of the currency of the poor country will indeed take place, but the real appreciation of 
the currency will be confronted by a general macro-economic constraint in the economy, i.e. the 
worsening budget situation. 
 
This Keynesian observation by Balassa and Samuelson (catching up is possible, but at the price of a 
rising budget deficit in the periphery and semi-periphery country) is of course familiar to the 
economics departments of Central Banks the world over. The Balassa/Samuelson effect is often 
debated in the context of the €-accession of the new EU-member countries. 
 
It is really surprising that European policy making now completely changed the roadmaps of what 
should be achieved. By institutionally now demanding from EU-member states in the so-called 14 
politically binding “Lisbon structural indicators” that EU-member countries henceforth should have a 
low international price level and also low price levels in the non-tradable sectors, European 
economic policy completely reverses Balassa/Samuelson.  
 
Largely unnoticed in the European political debate, this constitutes a 180 degree reversal of the 
direction of European economic policy since the postwar period. The Keynesian argument, proposed 
by Balassa and Samuelson, corresponded to the basic consensus of the structuralist and mildly state 
interventionist economic policies of the early postwar years. Balassa/Samuelson always implied that 
the periphery and semi-periphery country will catch up with richer regions, and will become a high-
price country itself one day. 
 
That the agenda of lowering international price levels is not just a coincidence, contained 
somewhere in 14 Lisbon structural indicators, also emerges from the recent very controversial 
services directive (“Bolkestein directive”). The very essence of the directive is now to have a single 
European market with fierce competition in the sector, which was formerly regarded as the “non-
tradable sector”, and to bring about unified low price levels for these “non-tradables” all over Europe. 
This fundamental revision of the Balassa/Samuelson catching-up process and its inherent logic 
has gone largely unnoticed, and yet it is a fundamental aspect of the international political economy. 
The main thrust of the catching-up process, described by Balassa and Samuelson, has been considered 
up to now as inherently economically sound and rational, and after all, catching up was the main 
argument for the “big” southward and eastward extensions of the European Union in the 1980s and in 
2004. 
 
One of the political absurdities of the Commission’s price level indicator is that countries suffering 
from currency crises are performing well on the price level indicator, while countries with a sound 
real appreciation of their currency – in the tradition of Balassa/Samuelson – are performing badly 
according to Eurostat. Let us again recall here that the Commission first defines that comparative 
“price levels” are, the ratio between GDP at purchasing power parities (PPPs) and GDP at market 
exchange rates for each country. To quote once more from Eurostat: 
 
“If the index of the comparative price levels shown for a country is higher/ lower than 100, the 
country concerned is relatively expensive/cheap as compared with the EU average.” (Quotation from 
Eurostat website, April 6, 2005, at:  
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http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1133,1406352,1133_1406373&_dad=portal&_sc
hema=PORTAL  
 
A country, following the Commission’s price reform strategy, is a country with a low international 
price level. As is well known, the EU-25 member governments use the „structural indicators“ to 
monitor their progress towards reaching the famous Lisbon agenda use. Eurostat says on its website 
that the  
 
“shortlist allows for a more concise presentation and a better assessment of achievements over time 
vis-à-vis the Lisbon agenda. In keeping with the recent streamlining of procedures in the wider context 
of the Lisbon strategy, it is foreseen to keep this list stable for three years”.  
 
The short-listed indicators are:  
 
GDP per capita in PPS 
Labor productivity 
Employment rate 
Employment rate of older workers 
Educational attainment (20-24) 
Research and Development expenditure 
Comparative price levels 
Business investment 
At risk-of-poverty rate 
Long-term unemployment rate 
Dispersion of regional employment rates 
Greenhouse gas emissions  
Energy intensity of the economy 
Volume of freight transport 
 
For our comparative data series, we have chosen Turkey (that suffered a severe economic crisis at the 
turn of the millennium), Iceland (a typical EEA high-price country), the Slovak Republic (that 
practiced the “Balassa/Samuelson” effect) Austria (that considerably lowered its international price 
level and according to Eurostat/Commission was a good performer) and Ireland (Europe’s economic 
miracle country – it had rising international price levels and was, according to Eurostat and the 
Commission, a bad performer on the price front). In Graph 5.2, we show the latest Eurostat price level 
data and their changes from 1995 to 2004 (yearly decreases of the international price level (according 
to Eurostat/Commission a good performance) and yearly increases of the international price level 
(according to Eurostat/Commission a bad performance)): 
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Graph 5.2a: what is a “good” international price level? Turkey’s economic crash in 
international perspective 
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Graph 5.2b: what is a “good” international price level? Turkey’s economic crash in 
international perspective – yearly decreases of the international price level (according to 
Eurostat/Commission a good performance) and yearly increases of the international price level 
(according to Eurostat/Commission a bad performance) 
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Balassa and Samuelson assumed that rising international price levels for the periphery country are a 
good thing. The ultraliberal underlying assumptions of the current Commission, member governments 
and Eurostat thinking on the subject were already described by Rao, who mentioned in a UNDP paper, 
back in 1998 that neo-liberal economics sustain the expectation of a growing price convergence 
from growing globalization (Rao J. M., 1998: 14-15). Falling relative price levels in countries like 
Germany over the last years would suggest in the neo-classical argument that the price of the 
non-tradables in the German economy decreased dramatically over time. Structuralist 
economists, like Stanford Professor emeritus Pan Yotopoulos, usually warn the weaker countries of 
the periphery that  
 
“Currency substitution represents an asymmetric demand from Mexicans to hold dollars as a store of 
value, a demand that is not reciprocated by Americans holding pesos as a hedge against the 
devaluation of the dollar!” (Yotopoulos and Sawada, 2005) 
 
Their argument, which they established in a 1999 paper, refined in their 2005 analysis, was the so-
called Y-Proposition, but this Y-position is very relevant today:  
 
“in free currency markets hard currencies fluctuate, while soft currencies depriciate systematically 
(...) The alternative scenario deprives devaluation of any of its remedial properties that in the 
conventional view lead to a process of stable interactions and equilibrium....”  
 
Their argument might be relevant for the continuing low international price level of countries like 
Turkey after the currency crisis of recent years. They think that the basic problem of international 
currency markets is asymmetric reputation. This process of asymmetric reputation of the periphery 
deepens the cycle of underdevelopment:  
 
“Mexico cannot service its foreign debt from the proceeds of producing nontradables. These are 
traded in pesos. It has instead to shift resources away from the nontradable sector to produce tradable 
output in order to procure the dollars for servicing the debt (...) The process (...) can create a negative 
feedback loop that leads to resource misallocation in soft-currency countries (...) This shift of 
resources represents misallocation and produces inefficiency and output losses (...) Distortions 
inherent in free currency markets lead to a systematic devaluation of soft currencies – to „high“ 
nominal exchange rates. Devaluation of the exchange rate means increasing prices of tradables and 
leads to increased exports. But not all exports are a bargain to produce compared to the alternative of 
producing nontradables (...) Countries graduate from being exporters of sugar and copra to exporting 
their teak forests, and on to systematically exporting nurses and doctors, while they remain 
underdeveloped all the same. If this happens, it may represent competitive devaluation trade as 
opposed to comparative advantage trade.“  
 
The authors further explain their ideas by an econometric analysis of economic growth rates in 62 
countries from 1970 onwards that shows how this process of competitive devaluation trade leads to 
stagnation. They also present an economic model in the tradition of Paul Krugman that shows how 
currency substitution triggers financial crises. In their 2005 paper, the authors show the relevance of 
their theories with time series data from 153 countries. Thus, if they are correct, a high ratio between 
purchasing power and GDP at exchange rates, i.e. an under-valued currency, will lead to 
stagnation. The countries with the strongest currencies, like Denmark, the UK, Sweden, are 
typical centers of the capitalist world economy with a favorable ratio of tradables to non-
tradables, while the countries with a Eurostat “good” low price level, like Turkey, are countries 
with an unfavorable relation between tradables and non-tradables, suffering from what neo-
Marxists like to call “unequal transfer” or “unequal exchange” (price reform/low international price 
level). 
 
Graph 5.3 now analyzes another aspect of this intricate problem, i.e. the relatively high price level of 
the Lisbon reference country, the United States of America, and the relationship of the exchange rate 
between the US $ and the € (based on Yahoo Finance). A strong $ makes America appear a high price 
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales  www.caei.com.ar  
International Relations Theory Program 
 68
country, while a weaker $ makes America appear a low-price country. A weak € (or for that matter, 
Forint, Zloty, TRK Lira…) is good for the price level, while a strong € (or for that matter, Forint, 
Zloty, TRK Lira…) is – according to this logic – bad for the price level indicator! 
 
 
Graph 5.3a: Comparative price levels. Comparative price levels of final consumption by private 
households including indirect taxes (EU-25 = 100) 
 
 
 
Graph 5.3b: The US $ - € - exchange rate, 2001 - 2006 
 
 
 
 
Following this logic, countries like Poland always should remain a soft currency zone, and to 
keep international price levels low, the real appreciation of the Polish Zloty vis-à-vis the € that is 
evident since 2004 should be stopped and even reversed: 
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Graph 5.3c: The € - Polish Zloty exchange rate, 2001 - 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
A good world system proxy for the “comparative price level” proposed by Eurostat could be simply to 
calculate internationally, for each country of the world, GDP per capita exchange rates/GDP per capita 
PPP and then fix the value for the United States of America as 1. High numerical values, under any 
specification, using the Eurostat method or proxy methods, will correspond, as in the Eurostat statistic, 
to countries like Norway, and low values will correspond to countries like Romania. A lowering of the 
indicator will, according to the underlying Eurostat logic, mean “price reform”, while a hypothetical 
movement upwards on the indicator (in our Table for Turkey from, say, 55 to 110) will mean a 
“setback”. However, a closer look at the underlying logic immediately tells us that such a “setback” 
could be brought about the appreciation of the Turkish Lira over time, while Turkey under this logic, 
for all purposes, “wonderfully performed” during the disastrous currency crisis of 1994 and 2001 
which impoverished large strata of the population. The relationship between GDP per capita at PPP 
and undervalued/overvalued exchange rates was introduced, among others in the classic article by 
Kravis, Heston and Summers, available freely online at: http://www.roiw.org/1981/339.pdf. Ever since 
the famous Kravis, Heston and Summers study, the relationship between the real GDP per capita 
income level and the ratio GDP PPP/GDP per capita has been thought to be an inverse one. Kravis, 
Heston and Summers say on page 344 of their famous article: 
 
“That is, the exchange-rate-converted estimates of GDP tend to understate the real GDPs of poor 
countries relative to the GDPs of the US and Europe. The systematic relationship between the ICP 
estimates and the exchange-rate-derived figures may be clearly seen by arranging the countries in 
order of increasing real GDP per capita; it can then be seen clearly that the ratio of real GDP per 
capita to exchange-rate converted GDP per capita – the “exchange rate-deviation index” – falls as 
per capita real GDP rises (..). A systematic association between the exchange-rate-deviation index 
and the level of real GDP per capita is a basic structural feature of the world economy” (Kravis, 
Heston and Summers, op. cit. p. 344, emphasis added) 
 
The richer you are, the lesser you are confronted with the factor GDP PPP divided by GDP exchange 
rates. A movement of countries over time on the “price reform” front could be brought about (with 
other things being equal), by a sharp decline in the external value of the currency or by an increase in 
the purchasing power at home, or by drastic declining prices in the non-tradable sectors. Precisely this 
„Bolkestein“ process seems to be taking place in Western Europe, because according to the Eurostat 
Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales  www.caei.com.ar  
International Relations Theory Program 
 70
statistics, Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus, Norway, Poland, Turkey, Bulgaria, Portugal, United States, 
Iceland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, United Kingdom, Italy, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Romania, and Malta had a rising international price level, but Japan, Switzerland, 
Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Euro-zone 
(12 countries), Denmark, EU (15 countries), and Spain had a sometimes dramatically sinking 
international price level. Most economists would tend to interpret an upward movement of the price 
level as a manifestation of the “Balassa/Samuelson” effect, but for the “negative” Balassa/Samuelson 
effect now talking place in Europe, there is hardly any explanation available: 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: The Balassa-Samuelson effect at the national level in Western European democracies, 
1998 - 2002 
 
 
 
dyn price level – time 
series correlation with 
Eurostat data  
 
dyn price level 
(conventional increase) 
 
Japan -0,371111 -49,1 
Switzerland -0,518831 -21,1 
Austria -0,791631 -14,1 
Germany -0,789294 -13,1 
Finland -0,646796 -12,2 
France -0,837372 -10,7 
Belgium -0,852605 -10,1 
Luxembourg -0,662598 -9,5 
Netherlands -0,330481 -5,2 
Sweden -0,701363 -4,4 
Euro-zone (12 countries) -0,616534 -3,8 
Denmark 0,0227029 -2,5 
EU (15 countries) -0,762661 -0,4 
Spain -0,470168 -0,4 
EU (25 countries)  0 
Slovenia 0,4550081 0,1 
Greece -0,359111 1,6 
Cyprus 0,7211103 2,5 
Norway 0,6431858 3,8 
Poland 0,6203526 6,4 
Turkey 0,5669177 7,9 
Bulgaria 0,9224584 10,7 
Portugal 0,6860582 10,8 
United States 0,7435605 13,2 
Iceland 0,8200233 13,7 
Czech Republic 0,9696909 14,1 
Slovakia 0,8820571 15,5 
United Kingdom 0,5793369 16,6 
Italy 0,8363308 16,6 
Hungary 0,952679 18,4 
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Latvia 0,8952075 18,5 
Estonia 0,9513549 20,9 
Ireland 0,9672517 24,1 
Lithuania 0,9448067 24,2 
Romania 0,402612 43,2 
Malta 0,526698 74,9 
 
 
 
In the following, we will now try to look into the consequences of the Balassa/Samuelson-effect and 
its reversal in the enlarged European Union. To this end, we predicted in multiple regressions the 
regional performance of regions in Europe (according to Info Regio, Commission) on the following 
predictors: 
 
 
average level of per capita incomes, 1999-2000-2001, EU15 = 100 
average level of per capita income^2  
Country wide dyn price level conventional method 
country-wide dyn price level correlation method (time series correlation national price level with 
time axis, Eurostat structural indicators data) 
dummy: until 1989 communist government 
per cent of the population with low levels of education 
per cent of the population with medium education 
Population density (inh./km²), 2001 
population size 
Share of agriculture in total employment 
Share of industry in total employment 
Share of population <65+ 
 
All the data are available on the Internet; the sources are given in the bibliography to this article. 
Recent quantitative studies about regional development in Europe (Heidenreich, 1997 – 2004) 
rediscovered mathematical formulations originally published by the American scholar George 
Kingsley Zipf17 (1902-1950), who started as a philologist but came to describe himself as a statistical 
human ecologist. He was for twenty years a Lecturer at Harvard. Leaving aside his flirtation with 
Nazism and fascism in Europe, his quantifiable prediction is that the European central regions will 
lose in demographic and economic importance vis-à-vis the “lesser” centers, ranking next in the 
national hierarchies of cities. Heidenreich simplified the mathematics and formulated: 
 
 
 (3) Zipf’s law: ln Population = a – b1 * ln rank of a city among the cities of a country 
 
 
Applied to our macro-quantitative setting, Heidenreich’s hypothesis could be compared with the other 
hypotheses and theories published in the literature: 
 
                                            
17 http://www.cut-the-knot.org/do_you_know/zipfLaw.shtml. In more analytical terms, the law is the observation that the 
frequency of occurrence of some event ( P ), as a function of the rank ( i) when the rank is determined by the above frequency 
of occurrence, is a power-law function Pi ~ 1/ia with the exponent a close to unity (1). 
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Table 5.3: different hypotheses of different theories to explain regional growth and the 
alleviation of (youth) unemployment in Europe – a schematic presentation 
 
 
predictor/Heidenreich's implied model influence on regional development (+ on growth, + on the 
alleviation youth unemployment) 
average level of per capita incomes, 1999-2000-2001, EU15 
= 100 
yes 
average level of per capita income^2  no 
Country wide dyn price level conventional method no 
country-wide dyn price level correlation method (time series 
correlation national price level with time axis, Eurostat 
structural indicators data) 
no 
dummy: until 1989 communist government  
per cent of the population with low levels of education yes 
per cent of the population with medium education  
Population density (inh./km²), 2001 no 
population size no 
Share of agriculture in total employment yes 
Share of industry in total employment no 
Share of population <65+  
  
  
predictor/neoclassical model influence on regional development (+ on growth, + on the 
alleviation youth unemployment) 
average level of per capita incomes, 1999-2000-2001, EU15 
= 100 
yes 
average level of per capita income^2  no 
Country wide dyn price level conventional method yes 
country-wide dyn price level correlation method (time series 
correlation national price level with time axis, Eurostat 
structural indicators data) 
yes 
dummy: until 1989 communist government yes 
per cent of the population with low levels of education no 
per cent of the population with medium education yes 
Population density (inh./km²), 2001  
population size  
Share of agriculture in total employment yes 
Share of industry in total employment  
Share of population <65+ no 
  
  
predictor/ultraliberal model influence on regional development (+ on growth, + on the 
alleviation youth unemployment) 
average level of per capita incomes, 1999-2000-2001, EU15 
= 100 
yes 
average level of per capita income^2  no 
Country wide dyn price level conventional method no 
country-wide dyn price level correlation method (time series 
correlation national price level with time axis, Eurostat 
structural indicators data) 
no 
dummy: until 1989 communist government yes 
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per cent of the population with low levels of education  
per cent of the population with medium education  
Population density (inh./km²), 2001  
population size  
Share of agriculture in total employment  
Share of industry in total employment  
Share of population <65+  
  
  
predictor/regional agglomeration + dependency model influence on regional development (+ on growth, + on the 
alleviation youth unemployment) 
average level of per capita incomes, 1999-2000-2001, EU15 
= 100 
no 
average level of per capita income^2  yes 
Country wide dyn price level conventional method yes 
country-wide dyn price level correlation method (time series 
correlation national price level with time axis, Eurostat 
structural indicators data) 
yes 
dummy: until 1989 communist government no 
per cent of the population with low levels of education no 
per cent of the population with medium education yes 
Population density (inh./km²), 2001 yes 
population size yes 
Share of agriculture in total employment no 
Share of industry in total employment yes 
Share of population <65+  
 
 
The empirical results are the following: 
 
 
Table 5.4: the multivariate determinants of economic growth and youth unemployment in 
Europe’s regions 
 
 growth t-test and 
direction of 
influence 
growth error 
probability 
youth 
unemployment 
error probability 
youth 
unemployment 
error probability 
 
average level of 
per capita 
income^2  
3,456 0,001 -0,320 0,749 
average level of 
per capita 
incomes, 1999-
2000-2001, EU15 
= 100 
-4,903 0,000 2,226 0,027 
Country wide dyn 
price level 
conventional 
method 
-0,292 0,771 0,499 0,618 
country-wide dyn 
price level corr 
method 
-1,345 0,180 1,834 0,068 
dummy: until 
1989 communist 
government 
-3,022 0,003 4,295 0,000 
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per cent of the 
population with 
low levels of 
education 
-7,137 0,000 3,224 0,001 
per cent of the 
population with 
medium 
education 
3,829 0,000 -3,601 0,000 
Population 
density 
(inh./km²), 2001 
6,351 0,000 -3,720 0,000 
population size -5,724 0,000 -1,983 0,048 
Share of 
agriculture in 
total employment 
-2,902 0,004 1,498 0,135 
Share of industry 
in total 
employment 
2,942 0,004 -0,100 0,920 
Share of 
population <65+ 
-2,301 0,022 -6,232 0,000 
 
 
This yields the following results: 
 
 
Table 5.5: a schematic representation of the causal effects 
 
 
causal influence on regional development in Europe significant effects on 
growth 
significant effects on the 
alleviation of youth 
unemployment 
 
Share of population <65+ - + 
Population density (inh./km²), 2001 + + 
per cent of the population with medium education + + 
population size - + 
average level of per capita income^2  +  
Share of industry in total employment +  
Country wide dyn price level conventional method   
Share of agriculture in total employment -  
country-wide dyn price level corr method  - 
average level of per capita incomes, 1999-2000-2001, 
EU15 = 100 - - 
per cent of the population with low levels of education - - 
dummy: until 1989 communist government - - 
 
 
These results fit in with the theoretical assumptions, explained in Table 5.3 above, in the following 
way: 
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Table 5.6: the explanatory power of different theories to explain regional development in 
Europe. A summary of our politometric results 
 
 
causal influence on regional 
development in Europe 
significant effects 
on growth 
Heidenreich 
explanation of 
growth 
neoclassical 
explanation of 
growth 
ultraliberal 
explanation of 
growth 
regional 
agglomeration + 
dependency model 
- growth 
 
average level of per capita 
incomes, 1999-2000-2001, 
EU15 = 100 
- rejected rejected rejected confirmed 
average level of per capita 
income^2  
+ rejected rejected rejected confirmed 
Country wide dyn price level 
conventional method 
  rejected rejected rejected 
country-wide dyn price level 
corr method 
  rejected rejected rejected 
dummy: until 1989 communist 
government 
-  rejected rejected confirmed 
per cent of the population with 
low levels of education 
- rejected confirmed  confirmed 
per cent of the population with 
medium education 
+  confirmed  confirmed 
Population density (inh./km²), 
2001 
+ rejected   confirmed 
population size - confirmed   rejected 
Share of agriculture in total 
employment 
- rejected rejected  confirmed 
Share of industry in total 
employment 
+ rejected rejected  confirmed 
Share of population <65+ -  confirmed   
      
causal influence on regional 
development in Europe 
significant effects 
on the alleviation 
of youth 
unemployment 
Heidenreich 
explanation of 
youth 
unemployment 
neoclassical 
explanation of 
youth 
unemployment 
ultraliberal 
explanation of 
youth 
unemployment 
regional 
agglomeration + 
dependency model 
– youth 
unemployment 
 
average level of per capita 
incomes, 1999-2000-2001, 
EU15 = 100 
- rejected rejected rejected confirmed 
average level of per capita 
income^2  
 rejected rejected rejected rejected 
Country wide dyn price level 
conventional method 
  rejected rejected rejected 
country-wide dyn price level 
corr method 
-  rejected confirmed rejected 
dummy: until 1989 communist 
government 
-  rejected rejected confirmed 
per cent of the population with 
low levels of education 
- rejected confirmed  confirmed 
per cent of the population with 
medium education 
+  confirmed  confirmed 
Population density (inh./km²), 
2001 
+ rejected   confirmed 
population size + rejected   confirmed 
Share of agriculture in total 
employment 
 rejected   rejected 
Share of industry in total 
employment 
 rejected   rejected 
Share of population <65+ +  rejected   
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In the final analysis, these results compare with the following main results, reported in the other 
Chapters of this study, in the following fashion. In order to be able to properly interpret the different 
results, we already took care of the many different implicit directions of the indicators etc. Significant 
t-values from our multiple regressions, supporting the pro-globalist policies of the Commission, are 
printed in blue bold letters, while results, clearly supporting the anti-globalization movements, are 
printed in red, bold, and indented letters. 
 
Considering other important intervening factors, like development levels and human capital formation, 
the ultraliberal thinking inherent in the Bolkestein directive that should lead to a considerable 
lowering of price levels in the formerly “non-tradable” sectors of services in Europe would be 
certainly compatible with some aspects of growth and better employment (and thus also gender 
relations), but our three main other indicators of globalization, i.e. high foreign saving, “economic 
freedom” and high MNC penetration ratios, are still very systematically linked with severe deficits in 
the social sphere, whatever the research design chosen. And in addition, powerful forces of 
agglomeration propel Europe in the direction of further regional income concentration and inequality, 
thus blocking the hopes of the poorer segments of the East European new member countries. A 
process of catching up development (“Balassa/Samuelson”) seems under these conditions a remote 
hope. 
 
 
Table 5.7: the main economic policy conclusions of our study – t-values and direction of 
significant predictors in multiple regressions 
 
 
determination of … by 
(static formulation) – 
nation states, world 
system (R^2 in brackets) 
by foreign 
saving 
economic 
freedom 
MNC PEN low international 
price level 
EU-15 membership 
 
human development index 
(91.14 %) 
-3,61 -5,49 -1,84   
freedom from a high infant 
mortality (81.74 %) 
-5,21 -6,64 -2,81   
gender empowerment 
(80.84 %) 
+1,81   +2,06  
life expectancy (72.82 %)      
freedom from high CO2 
emissions (62.09 %) 
-2,86 -4,05 -2,45   
economic growth (28.36 %)   3,94   
      
determination of … by 
(dynamic formulation) – 
nation states, world 
system (R^2 in brackets) 
by foreign 
saving 
economic 
freedom 
MNC PEN low international 
price level 
DYN MNC PEN 
dyn rank human 
development index (30.77 
%) 
  -4,47 +2,40 +2,23 
economic growth (38.08 %) -3,68  -4,49  +1,95 
determination of … by 
(dynamic formulation) – 
Europe’s regions (R^2 in 
brackets) 
population 
density 
population 
size 
free from 
communist 
past 
Downward 
flexibility of price 
levels, corr 
method 
industrial 
employment 
economic growth (36.25 %) 6,3 -5,7 3  2,9 
alleviation of youth 
unemployment (46.28 %) 
3,7 2 4,3 1,8  
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Table 5.8: The multivariate results for regional development in Europe, talking changes in the 
price level properly into account: the multiple regressions 
 
 
 
Economic 
growth 
Population 
size 
Population 
density 
(inh./km²), 
2001 
Agriculture Industry average 
1999-
2000-2001, 
EU15 = 
100 
 
65+ Education 
low 
education 
medium 
communist 
governmen
t until 1989 
average 
income^2 
dyn price 
level corr 
method 
dyn price 
level 
convention
al method 
constant 
 -0,0797 1,7818 -0,0002 1,1681 -0,0721 -0,0319 -0,2457 0,0536 -0,0450 0,0578 -0,0002 0,0000 8,9716 
 0,0139 0,2806 0,0001 0,3971 0,0147 0,0139 0,0344 0,0140 0,0149 0,0167 0,0001 0,0000 1,4148 
 0,3625 1,4225            
 14,9721 316,0000            
 363,5396 639,4020            
t-test and 
direction 
of 
influence 
-5,7238 6,3510 -2,9018 2,9417 -4,9028 -2,3006 -7,1373 3,8292 -3,0218 3,4563 -1,3453 -0,2915 6,3413 
t-test and 
direction 
of 
influence^
2 
32,7623 40,3354 8,4205 8,6534 24,0376 5,2927 50,9416 14,6626 9,1310 11,9463 1,8097 0,0850 40,2118 
t-test and 
direction 
of 
influence^
0,5 
5,7238 6,3510 2,9018 2,9417 4,9028 2,3006 7,1373 3,8292 3,0218 3,4563 1,3453 0,2915 6,3413 
degrees of 
freedom 
316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 316,0000 
error 
probability 
0,0000 0,0000 0,0040 0,0035 0,0000 0,0221 0,0000 0,0002 0,0027 0,0006 0,1795 0,7708 0,0000 
F equation 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 14,9721 
error 
probability
, entire 
equation 
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 
Legend: In this and in all following tables, very small decimal numbers are abridged according to established mathematical 
conventions, contained in the EXCEL routine. For example, a number 0, 000141972 will be abridged to 1E-04, i.e. a decimal 
number rounded to 0, 0001 and starting at the fourth number after the decimal point with three zeros after the comma. A 
number 9E-10 equals thus a decimal number with 9 zeros after the comma, i.e. 0, 0000000009. All our EXCEL 7.0 
calculations are from UNDP and other data sources, quoted above.  
 
As in all EXCEL 7.0 outprints, first row: un-standardized regression coefficients, second row: standard errors, second last 
row: t-Test and direction of the influence; last row: error probability. The values immediately below the standard errors are 
R^2 (third row, left side entry), F, and degrees of freedom (fourth row). Below that: ss reg; ss resid, i.e. the sum of squares of the 
regression and the sum of squares of the residuals. The right-hand entry in the third row is the standard error of the 
estimate y.  
 
 
Youth unemployment 
 
 
Country  average 
level of per 
capita 
incomes, 
1999-
2000-2001, 
EU15 = 
100 
average 
level of per 
capita 
income^2 
country-
wide dyn 
price level 
corr 
method 
Country 
wide dyn 
price level 
convention
al method 
Share of 
agriculture 
in total 
employme
nt 
Share of 
industry in 
total 
employme
nt 
per cent of 
the 
population 
with 
medium 
education 
population 
size 
Population 
density 
(inh./km²), 
2001 
per cent of 
the 
population 
with low 
levels of 
education 
dummy: 
until 1989 
communist 
governmen
t 
Share of 
population 
<65+ 
constant 
 0,5381 -1,0662 0,1670 0,0005 0,0001 -0,0101 -0,3480 -0,2121 -0,3600 6,4617 0,0020 -0,6482 56,6600 
 0,2418 3,3295 0,0910 0,0010 0,0001 0,1010 0,0966 0,1070 0,0968 2,0040 0,0005 0,1040 9,7003 
 0,4628 9,4393            
 22,2576 310,0000            
 23797,753
5 
27620,931
9 
           
t-test and 
direction 
of 
influence 
2,2256 -0,3202 1,8344 0,4993 1,4977 -0,1003 -3,6011 -1,9832 -3,7196 3,2244 4,2950 -6,2316 5,8411 
t-test and 
direction 
of 
influence^
2 
4,9533 0,1025 3,3651 0,2493 2,2431 0,0101 12,9676 3,9330 13,8353 10,3970 18,4470 38,8329 34,1179 
t-test and 
direction 
of 
influence^
0,5 
2,2256 0,3202 1,8344 0,4993 1,4977 0,1003 3,6011 1,9832 3,7196 3,2244 4,2950 6,2316 5,8411 
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degrees of 
freedom 
310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 310,0000 
error 
probability 
0,0268 0,7490 0,0675 0,6179 0,1352 0,9202 0,0004 0,0482 0,0002 0,0014 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
F equation 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 22,2576 
error 
probability
, entire 
equation 
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion – learning from Latin America 
 
 
Based upon solid quantitative evidence, this essay has shown the profound development crisis that the 
European continent is facing. The quantitative evidence presented both at a cross national level as well 
as the massive data presented in this work on increasing globalization and increasing inequality all 
seem to conform to the original Bornschierean paradigm that the long-term effects of MNC PEN are 
very negative, short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding. The latest Eurostat-data confirm our 
analysis both for the EU-25 as well as the Euro-zone. From the very start, Europe, and especially the 
Euro-zone, dismally fails the Lisbon agenda: 
 
 
Graph 6.1: the growing polarization in Europe according to Eurostat, 2006 
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Legend: based on Eurostat, structural indicators, February 2, 2006, available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1133,47800773,1133_47803568&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
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Graph 6.2: the growing stagnation in Europe according to Eurostat, 2006 
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Legend: based on Eurostat, structural indicators, February 2, 2006, available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/portal/page?_pageid=1133,47800773,1133_47803568&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL 
 
 
In many ways, it can be suggested that Latin America holds the mirror to Europe’s future, and that 
Europe now seems to undergo the very same neo-liberal shock treatments that failed in Latin America. 
 
With the late Andre Gunder Frank, we are inclined to predict a more thorough development crisis of 
the European continent, that seems to correspond to much more long-term shifts in the capitalist world 
economy, that bring back the dynamics of the entire system back to Asia, from these dynamics shifter 
by around 1750.  
 
It is to be hoped that European decision makers find the courage to go back to the beginnings of the 
successful European development model – i.e. social reform, mass demand, import substitution and 
social protection.  
 
There is a lot that Europe can learn from Latin America, and there is also a lot Europe can learn from 
all the economic theories in the wake of the contributions by the great Raul Prebisch. 
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